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ABSTRACT
The brown method of solving zero sum two person games
by a method of successive approximations was programmed for
the NCR-102A Digital Computer. Game matricies up to order
8x8 were investigated, although the program could easily be
extended to order 16 x 16 without leaving the magnetic drum,
or to arbitrarily higher order games by also using magnetic
tape. The problem of obtaining all strategies of a convex
set of optimal strategies was solved in a number of cases and
the concept of a complementary game was developed.
The Brown method was found to converge too slowly in
most cases so that a modification of the method was used. In
the Brown method, successive approximate strategies are devel-
oped for each player until a stage is reached in which the
opposing strategies give equal values to the game (or give
values sufficiently close), at which time (approximate) opti-
mal strategies have been obtained. Julia Robinson has proved
the convergence of the Brown method. The modification con-
sists in comparing a maximum value of the game for Player I
with a minimum value of the game for Player II at different
stages of the iteration until these values are equal or
sufficiently close to each other. The convergence of the new
method follows from the convergence of the brown method and
the new method was found to be generally much more rapid.
The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the
assistance and encouragement given him by Professor F.M. Pulliam
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INTRODUCTION
Two person zero sum games can be solved by a variety of
methods, the common methods being graphical, matrix methods,
linear programming, and the Brown approximation method. The
last two methods are especially adaptable to computer tech-
niques. The Brown method was investigated for two factors:
speed of obtaining a solution and the ability to extract more
than one solution, in case multiple solutions existed. The
Brown method was found to be quite slow and to only give one
solution for a single computer run; however, a variation on
the method which is both faster and able to produce more than
one solution on a single computer run was devised. This im-
proved method should be a valuable tool in the solution of
large games.
The sequence of topics to be discussed is as follows:
first, a quick look at the nomenclature and the general idea
of solving games; after this, the Brown method is discussed
from the heuristic viewpoint. Next is an outline of the
proof of the convergence of the Brown method, which is due
to Julia Robinson. A brief discussion of the results ob-
tained by the pure Brown method are then discussed for a few
sample games. The next chapter discusses the improved pro-
gram mentioned earlier, and this is followed by a list of
techniques tried to extract more solutions when they existed
and comments on the varying degrees of success of these





in turn, being followed in the last chap-
ter by the actual program as used on the NCR-102A computer.
1

The appendix contains tables showing some of the results
obtained on specific games which were solved in the course




The theory of games was developed to handle problems
involving conflicts of interest, such as in poker and war-
fare. In a military situation, a commander is required to
weigh each of his own possible courses of action against
each possible course of action of the enemy to properly de-
cide which course of action he should take. The commander
might, by evaluating the possible outcomes as they effect
him, assign numbers to these outcomes and formulate a table
(see Fig. 1) which tabulates these outcomes in matrix form.




Friendly Strategies © -3 2 4 -2
© 3-11 2
© 1 -2 -3
Figure 1
1
The commander desires to choose his course of action
so as to maximize his outcome, while the enemy wishes to
choose his strategy so as to minimize this outcome to his
opponent. The clash could be a one-shot affair or a situa-
tion which might repeatedly arise, such as a fighter attack
on a bomber.
When two opponents are involved in a conflict in which
each has a definite number of possible strategies and the
outcome for each pair of opposing strategies is known, it
3

is said to be a two person game . The game is said to be zero
sum if the sum of the outcomes for the opponents is zero;
that is, each player's loss is the other player's gain. A
matrix is used in which the rows correspond to strategies for
what is called Player 1, and the columns correspond to stra-
tegies for what is called Player II; the element a^ ^ in the
i row and j " column is the payoff to Player I if he uses
, th thhis i strategy and Player II uses his j n .
Player II Strategies
I H H H H- •
all a12 al3 alU .











. . . mn°m3
Figure 2
If the element a rs is the minimum element of the r*'*1 row
and the maximum of the sth column, then Player I is guaran-
teed the amount a if he picks his "pure strategy" (r) and
Player I can receive no more than a if Player II picks his
"pure strategy" [si „ In this particular case, Player I's
"optimal strategy" is (tj
,
Player Il's "optimal strategy"
is I s], and the "value of the game" is a rs . a rs is called a
saddle point, which is a desirable feature in a one-shot game.
All games of "perfect information," such as checkers, have
saddl e points
„
If there is no saddle point in the game matrix, then

if Player I uses his strategy (T) with probability x^ and




2*i - *< xi i 1








X'AY is the expectation of Player I if Player I uses mixed
strategy X and Player II uses mixed strategy Y. Player I
wants to maximize the expectation while Player II wishes to
minimize it. Player I will receive at least min X'AY so
Y
Player I selects X so as to get max min X'AY. On the other
X Y
hand, Player II can hold Player I to at most max X'AY so
X
he picks Y to realize min max X'AY.
Y X
John Von Neumann's fundamental theorem of game theory
states that max min X'AY = min max X 8 AY = v (value of the
X Y X Y
game). Hence, there exists a mixed strategy X* which is
such that the expectation of Player I will be at least v,
and there exists a mixed strategy Y* such that the expecta-
tion of Player I will be at most v. If Player I uses X*

and Player II uses Y*
s
the expectation of Player I will be
exactly v
?
the "value of the game." X* and Y* are called
"optimal mixed strategies." The "solution" of the game A
consists of determining possible X*, Y*, and v. The follow-
ing facts are stated for later use in this paper:
1. If a constant c is added to each element a^ ^ of
the game matrix A, the value of the game is increased by c,
but the optimal strategies are not changed. Therefore,
without loss of generality game matricies consisting only
of non-negative elements need be considered in this paper.
2. If x ± f in X* then Q) yields Player I the value
of the game if Player II uses Y*; similarly, if y, ^ in
Y* , the
J





THE BROWN METHOD OF FICTITIOUS PLAY
The Brown Method of Fictitious Play is a method of
successive approximations to the solution of a game.
The method is as follows
s
a. Player I picks an arbitrary pure strategy for his
first play,
b. Player II picks a pure strategy to minimize what
Player I would get from his previous play.
c. Player I then picks a pure strategy to maximize what
he would get against the pure strategy Player II has just
used and adds this pure strategy to what he picked before.
d. Player II next picks his best strategy against the
sum of Player l's past strategies. This process is then
repeated from the fictitious play of one player back to the
fictitious play of the other, over and over again.
e. Player I at play N forms the sum of his first N
pure strategies and divides the minimum number of this
"row sum" by N to get the "value of the game from below at
play N" symbolized by v(N), or more simply, v. This is the
approximate value of the game to himself through play N.
The number of times each pure strategy (1) has been selected
is divided by N to give x* for the approximate optimal
strategy X*(N)
.
f. Player II computes at his Nth play the sum of his
first N pure strategies and divides the maximum number in
the "column sum" by N to get an approximate "value of the

game from above at play N" , symbolized by v(N), or more
simply v, which is the amount that Player II must pay to
Player I, if Player II uses his approximate optimal stra-
tegy Y*(N) which is formed by dividing the number of times
each pure strategy has been picked, by N. This forms y*
whose sum, of course, is equal to one.
g. At the end of each pair of plays v(N) - v(N) is
computed and when this value becomes less than a predeter-
mined amount, the procedure is terminated. (See Chapter III
for the convergence of the procedure.)








Suppose that Player I picks (T) as his first pure
strategys H H [H
© 2 5 5 v(l) - 2
Player II will now take
| 1 j since 2 is the minimum of
the three choices. (T) (2) ^3)
(T]2 6 v(l)=6
Player I will now choose (2y since 6 is the maximum
element in 1 ;




Player II now has a choice between (T^ and (2^ since
they both equal 8, as a rule, for convenience, the first
of equals will always be picked
„
The following table shows the outcome for 12 plays,
while in Appendix A-12 this same game is carried out for
30 iterations
.
Play Strat„ Row Sum Min Hi Col. Sum Max ^i
N N
N i(N) 1 2 3 V j(N > 1 2 3 V V - V
1 1 2 5 5 2. 1 2 6 6. 4.
2 2 8* 8 9 4. 1 4 12 6. 2.
3 2 14 11 13 3.67 2 9 15 6 5. 1.33
4 2 20 14 17 3.5 2 14 18 12 4.5 1.
5 2 26 17 21 3.4 2 19 21 18 4.2 .8
6 2 32 20 25 3.33 2 24* 24 24 4. .67
7 1 3^ 25 30 3.57 2 29 27 30 4.28 .71
8 3 34 31 33 3.88 2 34 30 36 4.5 .62
9 3 34 37 36 3.64 1 36* 36 36 4. .36
10 1 36 42 4l 3.6 1 38 42 36 4.2 .6
11 2 42 45 45 3.8 1 4o 48 36 4.37 .57
12 2 48 48 49 4. 1 42 54 36 4.5 .5
The rule of selection is if two rows or columns are
equally desirable,, the program selects the first.
Table 1
An examination of play 9 shows that through play 9,
Player I is using a mixed strategy of (2/9, 5/9, 2/9)j the
value of the game to Player I is at least 3.64. Player II
at play 9 is using a mixed strategy of (3/9, 6/9, 0) and




ON THE ROBINSON PROOF
G. W. Brown conjectured in 19^9 (Ref. a) that the
method of solving rectangular games which bears his name
would converge and Julia Robinson proved the convergence
in an article published in 1951 (Ref. b)
.
Mrs. Robinson assumes the game matrix to be an mxn
matrix A (aij)« She uses Ai . and A.j to represent,
respectively, the ith row and the jth column of A, lets
the max of a vector be a maximum element of it, and the
min of a vector be a minimal element of it. She defines
a vector system for A as follows:
The system (U, V) in which U is a sequence of n di-
mensional vectors U(0), U(l), U( 2 )..... U(N
)
and V is
a sequence of m dimensional vectors V(0), V(l) V(N)...
is called a vector system for A if:
min U(0) max V(0) and
U(N 4 1) = U(N) Ai.
V(N +1) = V(N) + A.j
where i and j are such that vi(N) = max V(N) and either
Uj(N) = min U(N) or uj(N * 1) = min U(N 1)
If j is defined by uj(N) = min U(N), then for each
N, U(N + 1) and V(N 1) are obtained simultaneously from
U(N) and V(N). If j is defined by uj(N 4 1) = min U(N 1 ),
then the U ! s and V" s are obtained alternately. The alter-
nate method is used in this thesis since it converges more
rapidly than the simultaneous method. U(0) and V(0) may be
defined arbitrarily and if they are both null. U(N)/N and
10

V(N)/N are, respectively, weighted averages of the rows and
columns of A which are used in U(N) and V(N).
U(N) is the sum of rows of A which Player I computes
at stage N, and min U(N)/N his approximate value. V(N)
and max V(N)/N have similar significance for Player II.
Julia Robinson proved the basic theorem:
If (U, V) is a vector system for A, then
lim min U(N)/N = lim max V(N)/N - v the value of
N —> cxo N —> CO
the game A.
From the basic definitions
min U(N)/N 5 v 5. max V(N' )/N*
If for some N and N* the equalities hold, then optimal
strategies are known as well as the value of the game v.
Hence, it may not be necessary to take the limit in order
to get a solution to the game.
Mrs. Robinson proves the theorem through four lemmas:
Lemma 1. If (U, V) is a vector system for A, then




Lemma 2. Given a vector system (U, V) for A, then if all




max U(S + N) - min U(S N) < 2aN
and max V(S N) - min V(S 4 N) 1 2aN
where a max a^^
Note; "The ith row is eligible in (S, S N) if for
an N' such that
S < N" < S 4 N v (N* ) - max V(N').
11

similarly for the jth column with min U(N lf )."
Lemma 3. If all the rows and columns of A are eligible in
(S, S + N) for a given vector system (U, V) then max V(S + N)
- min U(S 4 N) 1 kaH
.
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have Lemma k :
Lemma U. To every matrix A and £> 0, there exists N such
that for any vector system (U, V)
max V(N) - min U(N) <£ N N> N
From Lemma ' s 1 and k it follows that
11m max V(N) - min U(N) «
N^oo N
From basic game theory
lim sup min U(N) < v and lim inf max V(N) > v





SOME RESULTS OF THE BROWN METHOD
Several different games will be examined in some detail
using the Brown method. Curves of successive values from
both above (v) and below (v) will be plotted and, for one
game, a brief plot of the current mixed strategy versus the
number of play c
Three different games illustrate three different possi-
bilities in the way that a game converges to its value. The




From the curve (Fig. 3), it is seen that although the
values v and v are at times equal to the value of the game
which is four, but not at the same play, convergence is an
extremely slow process taking approximately 2500 iterations
to converge to k decimal-place accuracy. However, looking
at Fig. 3a
s
which is purely a permutation of the game matrix
and therefore essentially the same game, convergence takes
place in exactly twelve plays to the exact value of the game ;
All 36 possible permutations of rows and columns are carried
out either to an exact solution or for 30 iterations in
Appendix A; and examination of these permutations shows that
six have exact values and that the other 30 all converge
slowly and cannot, in a finite number of plays, have exact















have been selected for Player II. It would be very desirable
to find what determined the rapid convergence for the 6 per-
mutations and the slow convergence for the rest. This
investigator was unable to see any pattern that might be
generally useful for picking the right permutation to solve
the game best.
The second game to be discussed is the permuted comple-
mentary game of the first illustration 5 ^ 3
5 3 6
2 6
In this game v is occasionally v, but v never becomes v
although max v approaches v asymptotically (Fig. U-) . It
required 536 plays for this game to converge to 3 decimal-
place accuracy.
The third case is when both min v and max v converge




the graph of the values on this game is Fig. 7, and the table
of values and strategies for the first 30 iterations is given
in the appendix.
Another example of a Case I game is illustrated in
Fig. 8j this is a game in which the optimal strategy of each
player is ( ,2, .2, . 2 , .2, .2). The mixed strategies versus
the number of play is given for a portion of the convergence
cycle. It is noted that a type of "inertia" seems to exist
in the selection of pure strategies to add to the mixture at
each play. For those that are below their share, they keep
16

being added to until they exceed the value and then are
allowed to fall off again.
The terms Case I, Case II, and Case III will be used
throughout this paper to type the three types of games










Number of play is plotted horizontally,
























The optimal strategy is (.2, .2, 2, 2, 2)




IMPROVEMENT ON THE METHOD
As was seen in Chapter IV„ although the Brown method did
converge as expected, in many games it was very slow and
yielded only one solution,, Hence, a modification of the
method was sought which might speed up the convergence and
also produce more solutions.




a glance at the chart in Chapter II shows a very interest-
ing result in that in play 2 the value for Player I is k,
and in step 6 the value for Player II is k . Since these
two are equal, k must be the value of the game. Again, in
step 12, Player I has a value of U=-as does Player II in
step 18. The next procedure is to verify that these are
truly solutions, so a test will be made of these strategies.
The strategy for Player I at play 2 is X* = (£, £, 0)
(x'aV =
|x2*^x6*0x0
or "2x5 + 2"x3 + 0x6Jx5*}x4*0x3
therefore, (§-, j^ s 0) is a solution for Player Ij and, as
will be shown later in Chapter VII, this is a basic solution.
Trying Player I 3 s other solution at play 12, the optimal
strategy is (3/l2, 7/12, 2/12), this gives values of
k^ k, kj? respectively against Player II' s pure strategies
1, 2, and 3* So this again satisfies the criteria for an
optimal strategy for Player I.
24

Player II has the strategy of (1/3, 2/3, 0) at play 6,
where the value from above is k . A check of this in the
summation £ a ijyi — v shows this satisfies the criteria
for an optimal strategy for the minimizing player,,
Play 18 gives the strategy (6/l8, 12/18, 0) which is
again (1/3, 2/3, 0) and, therefore, yields no new solution
for Player II. In fact, this solution is unique for him.
The Brown method was then modified to pick off the
maximum value of v (from below) for Player I and the minimum
value of v (from above) and retain the mixed strategies for
these values until a new maximum or minimum value was gene-
rated. Each new value generated and the corresponding
strategies were made available for print out. Whenever
v = v
s
a certainty of optimality exists. This modified
method not only gives a much faster solution but, as a bonus,
yields more than one solution as was seen in the example
above
„
In case max v (or min v) repeats itself in all 12 octal
digits on the computer^ one can be almost sure that it is
the value of the game as the probability of two twelve-digit
numbers being identical except in the actual limit is very
small (a check of several thousand iterations on various
games found no repeats except in the first two or three
iterations )
.
In the Case II example given in Chapter IV, convergence
to 3 decimal=place accuracy came in 25? iterations, as com-
pared to 536 plays of the Brown method. This is a saving in
25

time of over 50%*
Two graphs
,
Fig u 9 and Fi{j. 10, compare v-v of the
Brown method with that of the improved methods The first
2.5 plays are shown in Fig. 9, while the value differences
from iteration 265-290 are shown in Fig. 10 , It is to be
noted that although the v-v for the first few iterations
were quite irregular, the process seems to have settled down
to a cyclic process after many iterations as seen in the
second graph. Also, the values for the improved method are
considerably under those in the regular method and will,
therefore, give much faster convergence.
Of the 36 permutations of the Case I game illustrated
in Chapter II, 12 games fall into Case I category and have
exact solutions in a very few iterations as compared to only
6 games for the Brown method. All the rest of the 2k permu-
tations are class II games and their exact solutions can
normally be found by methods to be discussed later in just
a few iterations,, however, even letting them compute them-
selves out to the end result would still save about 50%
on time.
A check of the six additional permutations which give
exact solutions in the improved method (A-7 through A-12)
shows that each of these games picks up an undesirable
strategy and can never converge exactly by the Brown method
in a finite number of plays (play 26 in A-12, for example)
„
A little ingenuity can reduce the time required even
more. Consider again the Case II illustrat ion; refer to
A-37 which is a print out of the first 30 plays of the game.
26

It is seen that at play 6, Player II has a repeat value of
4 for the value of the game from above, and at play 7>
Player I receives a new max value from below. Since the
first play of Player I was arbitrary, subtract this row
from the row sum of all his strategies
(29, 28, 27) - (5, 4, 3) equals (24, 2k, 2k)
Dividing this by 6, which is now the number of plays
since one play of Player I was deleted, a value of k is now
obtained, giving a strategy of (0, 2/3, 1/3) which is optimal.
The number of iterations involved for solution is now
7 instead of the 256 of the improved method sans ingenuity
or the 536 plays of the Brown method. It is to be noted,
however, if an attempt were made to use Player l's max at
play 8 or 11 the method would have failed, while at play 13
it would have succeeded again. Since the computer is opera-
ting all this time, there is no loss in time to try a few
guided guesses..
Two Case III games were solved by the Brown method
and its modification o Convergence by the new method required
approximately 70% of the time required by the Brown method.
Another example of the superiority of the improved
method is the game
3 1 4 1 6
6 3 1^116 3 1^
4 16 3 114 16 3
This game converged to an exact value by the improved method
in only 40 iterations, while the Brown method used 1340
iterations to converge to only 2 place decimal accuracy and
27

the value of the game is three. Since this is a symmetric
game, the optimal strategies for both players are
(.2, .2, .2, .2, .2), Fig. 8 shows the strategies actually
being used at various plays from lk5 to 175 by Player I;
and with a sample again taken at iteration number 221, this
quite clearly demonstrates the inertia in the Brown method,
which is quite bad, even after as many iterations as these.
In summary, the improved method in Case I games is
vastly superior to the older method. For Case II games,
with a little hand manipulation and thought, the new method
is almost as effective as in the Case I games. For Case III









METHODS OF EXTRACTING OTHER OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
Various methods were tried to extract more than one op-
timal strategy in case it existed,, The first method attempted
was to permute the rows and columns of the game matrix. An
examination of A-l through A-6 shows the pure Brown method
always led to the same exact solution; therefore, the permu-
tations were not too successful with the pure Brown method.
The next attempt made was to add a small value to one
row or to one column; this was accomplished by multiplying
the matrix by ten and then adding one to the selected row
or column. This seemed to have no effect on the solution
in the games on which it was tried. The amount of the small
addition to the row or column was increased until a change
in optimal strategy was obtained. However, the fault now
was that the new solution seemed to have no relation to the
original game
.
The inverse game was also used in an attempt to extract
more optimal strategies. An inverse game is where the roles
of Player I and Player II are reversed by transposing the
game and then multiplying the elements by minus one. The
results on the inverse game were identical to those on the
original game.
The two methods which are to be discussed next were suc-
cessful. One is the improved method, as discussed in the
previous chapter, as its optimal strategies at various iter-
ations run up and down the line of optimal strategies. See
Fig. 11, which is a plot of the optimal strategies contained
31





which is tabulated in A-^.
The final method attempted and which was also quite
useful, but only in certain classes of games, is the com-
plementary game method which is discussed in considerable
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Xl 4- X2 4- X3 = 1 Figure 11
From A-4; The following are the optimal strategies for
Player I.
Play No, Strategy Between Play N and N*
1 (f h 0) (1-2)
2 (J J 0) (3-4)
3 (I I 0) (1-4)
4 (0 2 J/> (5-7)
3 3
5 (££1) (1-7)
6 (13 1) (8-12)
4a« (i - i2)
A plot of these values shows the complete line of solu-
tion for both the regular game (i,J,0) to CL,.3-,-L) and
the complementary game (1,3,1) to (0,2,1)





The concept of a complementary game is useful in a game
which has more than one solution and which also has the pro-
perty that the value of the original game and its complement
are the same. The complement of a game is the game formed
from the transpose of the original game matrix.
It is possible to combine the optimal strategies of a
game and its complement and determine the common point on a
line of solutions of both games. This common point is a
simple solution to both games. Two games, one a 3 * 3 and
the other a 3 x k i will be investigated in some detail to
demonstrate this feature.





x* - (i, i, 0)
xj - (i, 7/12, 1/6)
Y* - (1/3, 2/3, 0)
v - k
which is the game considered in some detail throughout most
of this paper, and its complement
A 8 = 2 6
5 3 65^3
X*c - (1/3, 2/3, 0)
Y*c = (1/8, 5/8, 2/8)
v = k
where X*c is the optimal strategy of the complementary game
The values obtained for the solutions were the first solu-
tions available by the improved method, as given in the
Appendix (A-12 and A-39)°
It is to be noted that Player I of the original game
34










Hence, it is to be expected that some linear combina-
tion of X* and Y* will be a point of separation for the
1 c
sets of optimal strategies for Player I in game A and for
Player II in game A 1 . Consider AX* + (l-A)Y*c and BY* +
(l-B)X*c. An examination of Y* and X* shows they are
identical and will, therefore, satisfy both the game and
its complement . In the case of X| it will not satisfy the
complementary game, and neither will Y*c act as an optimal
strategy in the original game
.




5x^ + 4x| + 0x3
This is an optimal strategy for Player I in the ori-
ginal game . However,, in the role of Player II in the
complementary game
,
the third value of kj? would not be
allowed in an optimal strategy.
Similarly, (1/8, 5/8, 2/8), which is an optimal stra-
tegy for Player II in the complementary game, is not
allowable in the original game for Player I:
k k




2x1 + 6x5 + 0x2
8 8 B













Since all values here are equal to or less than k, the
value of the game, this satisfies the requirement for the
minimizing player. Linearly combining these two "solutions"
in the third column of the original game or third row of
the complementary game, equating to the value of the game
and then solving for A yields the following:
£~A x i + (l-A) l/8_7 5 + /""A x § + (1-A) 5/8_7 k +
i~A x + (1-A) 2/8_7 3 = ^
or A 1/5 so that the linear combination
1/5X* + V-5Y*c - (1/5, 3/5 s 1/5) results.
A check of this strategy in the original game (and
also in the complement) shows that it gives exactly the
value for each strategy of the opponent and is, therefore,
a simple solution and an end point on the line of solutions
for either game.
Just knowing one solution in the original game above,
and one in its complementary game, is sufficient to determine
the entire line of solutions. Going back to A-12 and
picking the solution for Player I at Step 12 in the original
game, we obtain X* = (l/^j 7/12, l/6). This point is
used rather than the (-g ^ 0) as this point is not a basic
optimal strategy, whereas the (g^ z 0) is a basic optimal
36

strategy. The point (1/8, 5/8, £) optimal strategy from
the complementary game will still be used. These two points
will be combined linearly componentwise and equated to zero
iA 4 (1~A) (1/8) -
A = -1 (1-A) - 2
-l(i, 7/12, 1/6) +- 2(1/8, 5/8, i) m (0, 2/3, 1/3)
This is a basic optimal strategy for the complementary
game, but is not an optimal strategy for the original game
A(7/12) (1-A) (5/8) -
A - 15 (1-A) - -14
This yields for an optimal strategy (2, 0, -1) which, of
course, is not allowed . Now, equating the third components
gives
A(l/6) (l-A)i -
A = 3 (1-A) = -2
Combining the two points in the above ratios gives
(is s 0)« which is a basic solution to the original game.
Therefore, when a line of solutions exists, as above, and
the complementary game has the same value as the original
game, it is possible to determine both the common point
solution of both games and the end points of the line of
solutions
.
A 3 x U game will now be examined which satisfies the
condition that the value of the game A is equal to the
value of A\ the complementary game. Iherefore, the methods
applicable to the 3x3 game discussed previously will also
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apply here, It will be demonstrated that with only three
points (optimal strategies) , two from the original game
and one from the complementary game are sufficient to obtain
all optimal strategies (in this particular case, a plane).
12 3






v = 3/2 for both games
Two optimal strategies for Player II in A as determined
by the improved method were Y* = (U/lO, 0, 3/10, 3/10) and
Y* = (1/3, 1/12, 1/3, l/ 1*), while the strategy for Player
I in the complementary game was X* ** (1/6, §-, 0, l/3).
(More solutions than these were obtained from the run, but




















An examination of the results of the above products shows
that the third row does not yield exactly the value in the
original game. In the complementary game, the third column
(which is the same as the third row in the original game)
does not yield exactly the value of the game.
Solve the following two equations for parameters A and
B to determine two points on the common line of solutions
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A = 2, /AX* + (1-A)Y*__7 = (5, 2* 2> 4)





< i. i» it. i>
18 18 18 18
Components will now be linearly combined to find the ends of
the line which contains the points ( 5 S 3, 3, 5) and
16 16 16 16
(£ > it» iis ^) and stiH satisfies the game.
18 18 18" 18
C( 5) (1-C) 5
18 16
(1-C) = -8
9 ( I, i, i, I) -8 ( 5 S 3, 3 9 5)18 lS 18 18 lZ lZ 1Z 1Z
(o, b, i 9 0)
One end of the line is therefore ( g- -§ ) which checks
as an optimal strategy in both the original and complementary
games and is a basic optimal strategy in both,
D -27 (1-D)D( U ) + (1-D) 1 =
18 16
=27 ( 5) + 2i ( 5)
5 18 5 lZ
= 32
5 5
-2£ ( It) 4 22 ( 2) = °
5 18 • 5 16
The other end of the line and, again, a basic optimal
strategy for both games is ("g §) .
Next, the points ( k
s S £> 3) and (i £) will
10 10 10
be linearly combined componentwise to determine the end of






This yields the strategy (0, 0, 2* -£) which is, of
2
course, not allowed. Equating the fourth components,
however, give the results;
E 2 * (i-E) i - o
10
E - £ (1-E) - -2
2 2
This yields (1, 0, 3, 0) when combining J5 ( *£, 0, 2 t 2 ) ™ith
5 4 2 10 10 10
"2 (£» °> ^> ^)° This is again a basic optimal strategy
2
for the original game; however, it is not a solution to the
complementary game. This same solution could have been found
by first combining (•£ jz) and (1, 1, 1, ^) , then combining
3 12 3
(1, 1, 2, 0), the resultant, with (0 £ £ 0) to obtain the
Z Z 3
identical result of [\ s y 3, 0).
%
To obtain the other basic strategy in the complementary
game, it is necessary to combine ( 1, g, 0, 1) with (^ ^)
;
Z 3
this then yields (0, 2> > 1) which is a solution to the
complementary game, but not to the original game.
A three-dimensional graph of the plane of solutions is
given in Fig-. 12 for both the original game and its comple-
ment.. It is to be noted that in form, the solutions of the
complementary game are a mirror image of the solutions of
the original game.
Although there is nc proof available
s
it seems reasonable
to conjecture that each time a game and its complement have





f<W,o) C-fc,*J,*> X, + X, - I OfA )
The Optimal Strategy for a 3 x 4 Game and Its Complement
Figure 12
Xj + X2 « X3 t Xij. - 1
The plane of solutions of the game 12
3 2 1
2 1
The points (0,£,4,0), (4,0,3/^,0), (£>(>, 0,£) determine the triangle
bounded plane of optxmal strategies for the above game, The
points ( j-g\-|-,0) j (0 s 3/^ s s 4)s ( ° j'l's'i's °) determine the boundary
for the optimal strategies of the complementary game.
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exist, then this line or plane extends into a line or plane
of optimal strategies in the complementary game and the
dividing point
y
or dividing line between the two solutions,
may be I is evidenced by the line of solutions ir
fig. 11 and the plane of solutions in Fig. 12, the term
complement seems to be fitting due to the symmetry of optimal
strategies in the original and complementary game,
One could extend the notion of proving collinearity , as
was shown in the 3x3 game , to a notion of coplanarity by
forming the determinant which, if it equals zero, indicates
that all points lie in the same plane. In the example con-
sidered 4
> 0, 2* 2
10 10 10
3 12 3 IT
1> I. Z> 2
16 16 16 16
I< 1 » °» I
6 2 3
where ( ^ s 1_, 7,, 3) was another solution of the original
16 16 16 it
game as determined by the improved method. This check does




ANALYSIS Oif A RANDOiM GAME
This chapter gives an examination of a random 8x8
game o The elements of the matrix were picked from a table
of random numbers
,
and the game was then solved on the
computer using the improved Brown method.
5 4023881
6 97121+74623285532845738939402746269275334511379730046210
The game was a class III game with Player I having an
optimal strategy of (1/305, 8/305, 120/305, 17V305, S
2/305 2 9 ) „ Player Il's optimal strategy was found to be
(77/195, S 23/195, 95/195, 0, 0, S 0).
The value of the game from below (Player I) was 3° 685?
the value from above was 3°693<, which is a solution to
almost three significant figures The value from below came
on the 305th iteration whereas the value from above came
on the 195th play and was never improved upon through the
305th play, leaving a suspicion that the value from above
is quite close to the actual value of the game.
For Player I
s
strategy 1 was used only on the first
iteration and strategy 6 was used only twice, so both of
these were dropped from the optimal strategy for Player I „
Both will be tested a little later in this chapter against
Player II c s optimal strategy^ this will indicate they were
properly dropped. The optimal strategy for Player I is
43

now (0, .026 y .397, .577, 0, y 0, 0); Player II still has
(.395., 0, oll8, „487c S S S 0) for his optimal strategy
A check of the pure strategies of Player I against the
optimal strategy for Player II and the optimal strategy of
Player I against each pure strategy of Player II is tabu-
lated in the following table, which indicates that all of
the active strategies do yield the value of the game and
that none of the inactive strategies do.
































Indicates value of the game and, therefore, a pure





FLOW CHART AND NCR-102A PROGRAM
The program flow chart is shown in two sections (Fig. 13
and Fig. lk) % the first is the original Brown method; the
second flow chart is an addition to the Brown method which
eliminates the portion of the first chart, which is enclosed
in dotted lines „ The second flow diagram fits in between the
point Al and A2 on the original chart.
Memory cells 0000 through 0.561 are used in the program
proper, while the floating point sub-routine is inserted in
1000 and is about 100 octal words in length. The convert to
floating point form sub-routine is put into 1700 and uses
21 octal words
„
To utilize the routine it is required to put the game
matrix up to 8 x 8 in size in cells 0000-0100, putting the
first row into 0000-000?, the second row into 0010-0017, the
third row into 0020~0027
?
etc. The number of rows should be
entered in 0331 $ while the number of columns should be
entered in 0330. The number of rows minus one is put into
033^
s
while the number of columns minus one goes into 0333..
The value of V-V desired for convergence is entered in 0332;
it is entered as the exponential value in floating point form,
as the v-v generated by the computer for comparison is in
floating point form.
The original Brown method program is entered from
0400=056l
s
while the modification extends from 0110-0172.




2100 when on prints the v(hold)- v(hold) in floating
point form
2010 when on eliminates print of hold column tally
and v(hold)
2020 when on eliminates print of the hold row tally
and v(hold)
20^0 when on prints v, v, v-v in floating point form
and N (iteration number) in octal
The following cells contain the following information during
the operation of the program?
0100-0107 contains row sums
0200-0207 contains column sums
0300-0307 contains row tally
0310-0317 contains column tally
0320=0321 v F„P. form
0321-0322 v F.P. form
0324 iteration tally
032.5=0326 v-v F.Po form
0230-0237 row hold tally (Player I)
02^0-02^7 column hold tally (Player II)
0250-0251 v(hold)FeP. form
0252 iteration (hold) from below
0253=025^ v(hold)F Pc form
0255 iteration (hold) from above
0256=0257 v(hold)=v(hold)F„P„ form
A one should be entered in 0300 (or remembered) for the
first tally since, normally, the first row is picked as the
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first selection. In case it is desired to select a different
row to start the game;, say the fourth row, then a one should
be entered in 0304 instead of 0300; and the first step of
the program (0400) should be altered to 35 000401040104.
The time per iteration is eighteen seconds for an 8 x 8
matrix. All entries in the game matrix should be non-
negative integers.
Ihe actual program is listed in Appendix B.
A step-by-step example of the Brown method is given in
Chapter II « A step-by-step example of the modified form will
be given here for the game
2 5 5
6 4 3036
which is graphed in Fig. 3 and has the Brown play in A-ll
.
The following is a tabulation of computer prints with all
test switches off;
Play Computer Prints
1 230 1 231 232 250-251 2(fp) 0252 1
240 1 24l 242 253-254 6(fp) 0255 1
2 230 1 231 1 232 250-251 4(fp) 0252 2






3 240 2 1 253-254 5(fp) 0255 3
4 240 2 253-25^ 4.5(fp) 255 **
5 240 2 253-254 4.2(fp) 255 5
6 240 2 253-254 4(fp) 255 6
256-257 0(fp)
230 1 231 1 232 240 2 241 242 4 250-251 4(fp)
252 2 253-254 4(fp) 255 6
7, 8„ no print
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9 2U0 3 2Ul 242 6 253-254 4(fp) 255 9 256-2.57 0(fp)
230 1 231 1 232 2U0 3 2Ul 242 6
250-251 4(fp) 252 2 253-254 4(fp) 2^5 9
10 , 11 , no print
12 230 3 231 7 232 2 250-251 4(fp) 252 12 256-257 0(fp)
230 3 231 7 232 2 240 3 24l 242 6
250-251 4(fp 252 12 253-254 4(fp) 255 9
For an explanation of the print out, examine play 2; The
symbols 230 1 231 1 232 mean that Player I has picked
row 1 (230) once, row 2 (231) once, and row 3 (232) zero times.
The v(hold) (250-251) is 4 and is in floating point form with
cell 250 containing the exponential portion and 251 containing
the fractional portion of the value. The iteration when this
particular strategy and value occured is at play 2, indicated
by 252 2 . Player l's strategy through two plays is therefore
( s s 2s )
„
The 240-242 cells contain Player II' s strategy, while
v(hold) is in 253-254 in floating point form, and the iteration
when Player Il's "hold" strategy occurred is in 255- Whenever
256-257 prints out, it contains v(hold) - v(hold) for the
strategies being held in 230-232 and 240-242
.
If switches 2010 and 2020 had been on, only the print outs
for plays 6, 9> 12 would have appeared and only the parts from
256-257 on in each case. An examination of play 6 shows that
since v(hold) - v(hold) is (256-257), the strategies are
exact and (jjr j? 0) is the strategy for Player I and/l, 0, 2\
3 3
is exact for Player II with value of the game being four.
Play 9 gives exactly the same optimal strategies for both
players as play 6, however, play 12 gives a new optimal
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strategy for Player I of (^, 7,, 1) while Player II still
12 Z
maintains his old strategy of (l
s
0, 2) c A line of sola-
3 3
tions therefore exists for Player I; the methods on page 36
can be used to determine the entire line, It is to be noted
that on play 21 of this game (A-ll), Player II picks up a
strategy which is not used in the optimal mixture and from
this play on, Player II will never have an exact strategy in






































































It is felt that the improvement to the Brown method
makes this a practical method to use, even with relatively
slow computers.
There are, however; many problems left to solve to
make this method even more ef f ect ive-~the primary one being,
what is the optimal row column arrangement for speedy solu-
tion
.
A second idea worthy of more investigation is that in
a changing situation, the relative weights of the elements
in the game matrix may change. It is often important in such
a changing situation to also keep the effects of the past
in the problem. This method should be ideal to partially
solve a game with one set of elements in the game matrix,
then substitute the new elements in at a proper time into
the matrix and finish the solution to any degree of accuracy
desired. The problem here would be when in the play to
substitute the new elements to give a proper answer.
A further investigation of complementary games, inclu-
ding those where the value is not equal to the original game,
might lead to some interesting and useful conclusions about
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This appendix contains the first 30 iterations of all





The only exceptions are the first 6 games (A-l through
A-6)--these have exact Brown solutions in 12 iterations
and, therefore, play stops at the end of 12 plays. This
appendix also contains 3 other game matricies which are
used in the thesis--these are the last 3 games in the
appendix
.
The first **• plays of A-U- are worked out below to









ROW SUM COL. SUM

































N is the number of the play.
i is the row played at play N by Player I.
j is the column played at play N by Player II.
T-i T2 T3 , adjacent to i are the row sum for Player I.
Ti T2 T3 , adjacent to j are the column sum for Player II.
5^

v is the min of the row sum divided by N .
v is the max of the column sum divided by N .
v - v is the difference between the current approximate
value and the true value of the game.
As an example, at play 2, Player I has a strategy of
row 1 once; row 2 once; and row 3 zero times, or (g~gO).
His expectation, when playing this strategy, is at least
v -- in this case, U- . Player II at play 2 has a strategy
of ( 0^|- ) and his expectation-- the most he can lose--is v
(in this case, ^-.5). This leaves v - v («5) in doubt.
At play 3, the strategies are (l/3, 2/3, 0) for Player I;
and his expectation has dropped to 3o75« while Player II
has a strategy of (0, 2/3, 1/3) and his expectation has
improved to -4. When v - v = 0, a solution by the Brown










ROW SUM COL. SUM
N Tl T2 T3 Tl T2 T3 v - v
1 1 5 5 2 2. 3 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 8 9 8 4° 1 7 6 9 4.5 .5
3 3 11 13 14 3.66 1 12 12 12 4. .34
4 1 16 18 16 4„ 1 17 18 15 4.5 .5
5 2 22 21 16 3.2 3 19 18 21 4.2 1.0
6 3 25 25 22 3o66 3 21 18 27 4.5 .84
7 3 28 29 28 4« 1 26 24 30 4.29 .29
8 3 31 33 34 3.87 1 31 30 33 4.12 .25
9 3 34 37 40 3.77 1 36 36 36 4.0 .23
10 1 39 42 42 3.9 1 41 42 39 4.2 .3
11 2 45 45 42 3.81 3 43 42 45 4.09 .28

















ROW SUM COL, SUM









































































































































































































































































1 1 5 2 5 2. 2 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 8 8 9 4,0 1 7 6 9 4.5 .5
3 3 11 14 13 3.67 1 12 12 12 4.0 .33
4 1 16 16 18 4,0 1 17 18 15 4.5 .5
5 2 22 16 21 3»2 2 19 18 21 4.2 1.0
6 3 25 22 25 3,67 2 21 18 27 4.5 .88
7 3 28 28 29 4,0 1 26 24 30 4.29 .29
8 3 31 34 33 3.87 1 31 30 33 4.12 .25
9 3 34 40 37 3o77 1 36 36 36 4.0 .23
10 1 39 42 42 3*9 1 4l 42 39 4.2 .3
11 2 45 42 45 3°8l 2 43 42 45 4.09 .28




® 5 5 2
D 1* 3 6
D 3 6
ROW SUM COL, SUM
















1 5 5 2
5) 3 6
3 4 3 6
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 5 5 2 2. 3 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 9 8 8 4. 2 7 6 9 9.5 .5
3 3 13 11 14 3o 67 2 12 12 12 4. .33
4 1 18 16 16 4. 2 17 18 15 ^5 .5
5 2 21 22 16 3° 2 3 19 18 21 4.2 1.
6 3 25 25 22 3. 67 3 21 18 27 k.5 .83
7 3 29 28 28 4, 2 26 24 30 4.28 .28
8 3 33 31 lh 3. 87 2 31 30 33 4.12 .25
9 3 37 3^ 4o 3. 77 2 36 36 36 4. .23
10 1 42 39 42 3. 9 2 4l 42 39 4.2 .3
11 2 h5 ^5 42 3. 82 3 43 42 45 4.09 .27

















ROW SUM COLo SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 5 5 2 2„ 3 2 6 6. 4.
2 2 8 9 8 4 1 7 9 6 k. 5 • 5
3 2 11 13 14 3o 67 1 12 12 12 4, .33
4 1 16 18 16 4 1 17 15 18 b.5 .5
5 3 22 21 16 3. 2 3 19 21 18 4„2 1.
6 2 25 25 22 3° 67 3 21 27 18 **. 5 .83
7 2 28 29 28 4„ 1 26 30 24 4,28 .28
8 2 31 33 34 3c 87 1 31 33 30 4.12 .25
9 2 3** 37 40 3. 77 1 36 36 36 4. .23
10 1 39 42 42 3c 9 1 4l 39 42 4.2 .3
11 3 45 h$ 42 3 c 82 3 ^3 45 42 4.09 .27







© 5 2 5
® 3 6 4
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 2 2 6 6, 6.
2 3 9 6 7 3. 2 4 12 6. 3.
3 3 12 12 11 3 067 1 6 9 15 5o 1.33
4 3 15 18 15 3«75 1 12 14 18 4.5 • 75
5 3 18 24 19 3o6 1 18 19 21 4,2 .6
6 3 21 30 23 3o5 1 24 24 24 4,0 .5
7 1 27 30 26 3»72 3 27 29 28 4,14 .42
8 2 32 32 31 3o87 3 30 34 32 4,25 • 37
9 2 37 34 36 3*78 2 30 36 38 4,22 .44
10 3 4o 40 40 4,0 1 36 41 41 4,1 .1
11 2 45 42 45 3»8l 2 36 43 47 4.27 .46
12 3 48 48 49 4,0 1 42 48 50 4,17 .17
13 3 51 54 53 3o92 1 48 53 53 4,07 .15
14 2 56 56 58 4,0 1 54 58 56 4,14 .14
15 2 61 58 63 3*87 2 5h 60 62 4,13 .26
16 3 64 64 67 4,0 1 60 65 65 4,06 .06
17 2 69 66 72 3*89 2 60 67 71 4.17 .28
18 3 72 72 76 4.0 1 66 72 7k 4,11 .11
19 3 75 78 80 3o95 1 72 77 77 4,05 .1
20 2 80 80 85 4,0 1 78 82 80 4,1 .1
21 2 85 82 90 3°9 2 78 84 86 4,09 .19
22 3 88 88 94 4,0 1 84 89 89 4,04 .04
23 2 93 90 99 3o91 2 84 91 95 4,13 .22
24 3 96 96 103 4.0 1 90 96 98 4,08 .08
25 3 99 102 107 3»96 1 96 101 101 4,03 .07
26 1 105 102 110 3o93 2 96 103 107 4.12 • 19
27 3 108 108 114 4,0 1 102 108 110 4.07 .07
28 3 111 114 118 3.96 1 108 113 113 4,03 .07
29 2 116 116 123 4,0 1 114 118 116 4.07 .07






® 2 5 5
(2) 6 3
3 6 3 4
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Ti T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 2 5 5 2. 1 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 8 8 9 4. 1 k 12 6. 2.
3 3 14 11 13 3.67 2 9 6 15 5. 1.33
4 3 20 11+ 17 3.5 2 11* 12 18 4.5 1.
5 3 26 17 21 3. ** 2 19 18 21 4.2 .8
6 3 32 20 25 3.33 2 24 24 24 4.0 .67
7 1 3k 25 30 3,57 2 29 30 27 4.28 .71
8 2 3k 31 33 3.87 2 3k 36 30 4.5 .63
9 2 3k 37 36 3.77 1 36 36 36 4.0 .23
10 1 36 k2 kl 3,6 1 38 36 42 4.2 .6
11 3 k2 k5 k5 3,8l 1 40 36 48 4.37 .56
12 3 k8 k8 k9 4.0 1 42 36 54 4.5 .5
13 3 5k 51 53 3.92 2 47 42 57 4.38 .46
14 3 60 5k 57 3*85 2 52 48 60 4.28 .43
15 3 66 57 61 3.8 2 57 54 63 4.2 .4
16 3 72 60 65 3.75 2 62 60 66 4.12 .37
17 3 78 63 69 3,71 2 67 66 69 4.06 .35
18 3 8k 66 73 3.67 2 72 72 72 4,0 .33
19 1 86 71 78 3c73 2 77 78 75 4.11 .38
20 2 86 77 81 3.85 2 82 84 78 4.2 .35
21 2 86 83 8k 3.95 2 87 90 81 4.28 .33
22 2 86 89 87 3.91 1 89 90 87 4.09 .18
23 2 86 95 90 3. 7k 1 91 90 93 4.04 .30
24 3 92 98 9k 3.83 1 93 90 99 4.12 .29
25 3 98 101 98 3.92 1 95 90 105 4.2 .28
26 3 lOfc 104 102 3.93 3 100 93 109 4.19 .19
27 3 110 107 106 3.9^ 3 105 96 113 4.18 .24
28 3 116 110 110 3.93 2 110 102 116 4.15 .22
29 3 122 113 ll4 3.9 2 115 108 119 4.11 .21







(1) 2 5 5
(2) 3 6
© 6 4 3
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 2 5 5 2o 1 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 8 9 8 4. 1 4 12 6. 2.
3 3 14 13 11 3o75 3 9 6 15 5- 1.25
4 3 20 17 14 3.5 3 14 12 18 4.5 1.
5 3 26 21 17 3.4 3 19 18 21 4.2 .8
6 3 32 25 20 3.33 3 24 24 24 4. .67
7 1 34 30 25 3.43 3 29 30 27 4.29 .86
8 2 3k 33 31 3.87 3 34 36 30 4.5 .63
9 2 3k 36 37 3o77 1 36 36 36 4.0 .23
10 1 36 41 42 3.6 1 38 36 42 4.2 .6
11 3 k2 k5 45 3.82 1 40 36 48 4.36 .54
12 3 k8 49 48 4 1 42 36 54 4.5 .5
13 3 5k 53 51 3.92 3 47 42 57 4.38 .46
14 3 60 57 54 3.86 3 52 48 60 4.28 .42
15 3 66 61 57 3.8 3 57 54 63 4.20 .4
16 3 72 65 60 3.74 3 62 60 66 4.13 .39
17 3 78 69 63 3.71 3 67 66 69 4.06 .35
18 3 84 73 66 3.66 3 72 72 72 4. .34
19 1 86 78 71 3.73 3 77 78 75 4.11 .38
20 2 86 81 77 3.84 3 82 84 78 4.2 .36
21 2 86 84 83 3.95 3 87 90 81 4.28 .33
22 2 86 87 89 3.9 1 89 90 87 4.22 .32
23 2 86 90 95 3.73 1 91 90 93 4.04 • 31
24 3 92 94 98 3.83 1 93 90 99 4.11 .28
25 3 98 98 101 3.92 1 95 90 105 4.2 .28
26 3 104 102 104 3.93 2 100 93 109 4.19 .26
27 3 110 106 107 3.96 2 105 96 113 4.18 .22
28 3 116 110 110 3.93 2 110 99 117 4.17 .24
29 3 122 114 113 3.89 3 115 105 120 4.14 .25





1 5 2 5
2 3 6
3 4 6 3
HOW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V 3 Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 5 2 5 2. 2 2 6 6. 4.
2 3 9 8 8 k. 2 4 12 6, 2.
3 3 13 14 11 3.67 3 9 6 15 5. 1.33
k 3 17 20 14 3*5 3 14 12 18 4.5 1.
5 3 21 26 17 3o4 3 19 18 21 4.2 .8
6 3 25 32 20 3.33 3 24 24 24 4. .67
7 1 30 34 25 3*57 3 29 30 27 4.29 .62
8 2 33 34 31 3o87 3 34 36 30 4.5 .63
9 2 36 3^ 37 3.77 2 36 36 36 4. .23
10 1 4l 36 42 3o6 2 38 36 42 4.2 .6
11 3 45 42 45 3*81 2 40 36 48 4.36 .55
12 3 49 48 48 4. 2 42 36 54 4.5 .5
13 3 53 54 51 3.92 3 47 42 57 4.38 .46
14 3 57 60 54 3.85 3 52 48 60 4,28 .43
15 3 61 66 57 3.8 3 57 54 63 4.2 .4
16 3 65 72 60 3.75 3 62 60 66 4.12 .37
17 2 68 72 66 3o89 3 67 66 69 4.06 .17
18 3 72 78 69 3.83 3 72 72 72 4. .17
19 1 77 80 74 3.9 3 77 78 75 4.1 .2
20 2 79 80 80 3.95 2 79 78 81 4,05 .1
21 3 83 86 83 3.95 1 84 81 85 4.04 .09
22 3 87 92 86 3.91 3 89 87 88 4.04 .13
23 1 92 94 91 3.95 3 94 93 91 4.08 .13
24 1 97 96 96 4 C 2 96 93 97 4.03 .03
25 3 101 102 99 3.96 3 101 99 100 4.04 .08
26 1 106 104 104 4, 2 103 99 106 4.07 .07
27 3 110 110 107 3.97 3 108 105 109 4.03 .06
28 3 134 116 110 3.93 3 113 111 112 4.03 .10
29 1 119 118 115 3.97 3 118 117 115 4.07 .10







i; 2 5 5
2 6 4 3
3 3 6
ROW SUM COLc SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 2 5 5 2, 1 2 6 6. 4.
2 2 8 9 8 4, 1 4 12 6. 2.
3 2 14 13 11 3o67 3 9 15 6 5o 1.33
4 2 20 17 Ik 3-5 3 14 18 12 4.5 1.
5 2 26 21 17 3.4 3 19 21 18 4.2 .8
6 2 32 25 20 3^33 3 24 24 24 4. .67
7 1 3k 30 25 3.57 3 29 27 30 4,28 .71
8 3 3k 33 31 3 87 3 34 30 36 4.5 .63
9 3 3k 36 37 3 77 1 36 36 36 4. .23
10 1 36 41 42 3.6 1 38 42 36 4.2 .6
11 2 k2 k5 k5 3.81 1 40 48 36 4.36 .55
12 2 48 49 k8 4,. 1 42 5k 36 4.5 .5
13 2 54 53 51 3c92 3 k7 57 42 4.38 .46
14 2 60 57 5k 3.85 3 52 60 48 4.28 .43
15 2 66 61 57 3,8 3 57 63 5k 4,2 .4
16 2 72 65 60 3o75 3 62 66 60 4.12 .37
17 2 78 69 63 3*71 3 67 69 66 4.06 .25
18 2 84 73 66 3,67 3 72 72 72 4. .33
19 1 86 78 71 3o73 3 77 75 78 4.1 .37
20 3 86 81 77 3.85 3 82 78 84 4.2 .35
21 3 86 84 83 3.95 2 87 82 87 4.14 .19
22 1 88 89 88 4. 1 89 88 87 4.04 .04
23 1 90 9k 93 3o91 1 91 94 87 4,08 .17
24 2 96 98 96 4, 1 93 100 87 4.16 .16
25 2 102 102 99 3o96 3 98 103 93 4.12 .16
26 2 108 106 102 3.93 3 103 106 99 4.08 .15
27 2 114 110 105 3o89 3 108 109 105 4.03 .14
28 2 120 114 108 3.85 3 113 112 111 4,03 .18
29 1 122 119 113 3.89 3 118 115 117 4.07 .18





T 2 5 5
2 6 3 4
3 6 3
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T 2 T 3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 2 5 5 2 C 1 2 6 6. 4.
2 2 8 8 9 4, 1 4 12 6. 2.
3 2 11+ 11 13 3o67 2 9 15 6 5. 1.33
4 2 20 11+ 17 3.5 2 14 18 12 4.5 1.
5 2 26 17 21 3.4 2 19 21 18 4.2 .8
6 2 32 20 25 3.33 2 24 24 24 4, .67
7 1 34 25 30 3.57 2 29 27 30 4,28 .71
8 3 3k 31 33 3o88 2 34 30 36 4.5 .62
9 3 3k 37 36 3.64 1 36 36 36 4. .36
10 1 36 k2 kl 3.6 1 38 42 36 4.2 .6
11 2 k2 k5 k5 3.8 1 40 48 36 4.37 .57
12 2 k8 k8 k9 4. 1 42 54 36 4.5 .5
13 2 5k 51 53 3.92 2 47 57 42 4.38 .44
14 2 60 5k 57 3.86 2 52 60 48 4.28 .42
15 2 66 57 61 3.8 2 57 63 54 4.2 .4
16 2 72 60 65 3.74 2 62 66 60 4.12 .38
17 2 78 63 69 3.7 2 67 69 66 4.06 .36
18 2 8k 66 73 3.67 2 72 72 72 4. .33
19 1 86 71 78 3.73 2 77 75 78 4.1 .37
20 3 86 77 81 3.85 2 82 78 84 4.2 .35
21 3 86 83 8k 3.93 2 87 81 90 4.28 .35
22 3 86 89 87 3.91 1 89 87 90 4.08 .17
23 3 86 95 90 3.74 1 91 93 90 4.03 .29
24 2 92 98 9k 3.8 1 93 99 90 4.12 .32
25 2 98 101 98 3.91 1 95 105 90 4.2 .29
26 2 104 104 102 3.92 3 100 109 93 4.19 .27
27 2 110 107 106 3.96 3 105 113 96 4.18 .22
28 2 116 110 110 3.93 2 110 116 102 4.15 .22
29 2 122 113 114 3.89 2 115 119 108 4.11 .22






i i* 3 6
J) 3 6
© 5 5 2
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V 3 Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 k 3 6 3o 2 3 6 5 6. 3.
2 2 7 9 6 3. 3 9 6 7 4.5 1.5
3 1 11 12 12 3o67 1 13 9 12 4.33 .66
4 1 15 15 18 3 = 75 1 17 12 17 4.25 .5
5 1 19 18 24 3o6 2 20 18 22 4.4 .8
6 3 24 23 26 3.82 2 23 24 27 4.5 .68
7 3 29 28 28 4. 2 26 30 32 4.55 .55
8 3 34 33 30 3.75 3 32 30 34 4.25 .5
Q 3 39 38 32 3o55 3 38 30 36 4.22 .67
10 1 43 4l 38 3»8 3 44 30 38 4.4 .6
11 1 47 44 44 4 2 ^7 36 43 4.26 .26
12 1 51 k7 50 3*92 2 50 42 48 4.17 .25
13 1 55 50 56 3»84 2 53 48 53 4.07 .23
14 1 59 53 62 3.79 2 56 5k 58 4.14 .35
15 3 Sk 58 64 3.87 2 59 60 63 4.2 .33
16 3 69 63 66 3.93 2 62 66 68 4.25 .33
17 3 74 68 68 4 C 2 65 72 73 4.29 .29
18 3 79 73 70 3o89 3 71 72 75 4.17 .28
19 3 84 78 72 3.79 3 77 72 77 4.05 .26
20 1 88 81 78 3.9 3 83 72 79 4.15 .25
21 1 92 84 84 4„ 2 86 78 84 4.09 .09
22 1 96 87 90 3.95 2 89 84 89 4.04 .09
23 1 100 90 96 3.91 2 92 90 94 4.04 .13
24 3 105 95 98 3.96 2 95 96 99 4.12 .16
25 3 104 100 100 4 C 2 98 102 104 4.16 .16
26 3 109 105 102 3.92 3 104 102 106 4.08 .16
27 3 114 110 104 3.85 3 110 102 108 4.07 .22
28 1 118 113 110 3.93 3 116 102 110 4.14 .21
29 1 122 116 116 4. 2 119 108 115 4.11 .11




i j S g
T^ i» 6 3
^ 5 2 5
© 3 6
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V j Tl T2 T3 V v - V
1 1 1* 6 3 3. 3 3 5 6 6. 3.
2 3 7 6 9 3. 2 9 7 6 4.5 1.5
3 1 11 12 12 3.67 1 13 12 9 4.33 .66
U 1 15 18 15 3.75 1 17 17 12 4.25 .5
5 1 19 24 18 3.6 3 20 22 18 4.4 .8
6 2 24 26 23 3.83 3 23 27 24 4.5 .67
7 2 29 28 28 4, 2 29 29 24 4.14 .14
8 1 33 34 31 3.88 3 32 34 30 4.25 .37
9 2 38 36 36 4. 2 38 36 30 4.12 .12
10 1 42 42 39 3.9 3 41 41 36 4.1 .2
11 1 1+6 48 42 3.81 3 44 46 42 4.18 .37
12 2 51 50 k7 3.87 3 47 51 48 4.25 .38
13 2 56 52 52 4. 2 53 53 48 4.07 .07
Ik 1 60 58 55 3.93 3 56 58 5k 4.14 .21
15 2 65 60 60 4. 2 62 60 5k 4.13 .13
16 1 69 66 63 3.9^ 3 65 65 60 4.06 .12
17 1 73 72 66 3.88 3 68 70 66 4.12 .24
18 3 76 72 72 k. 2 7k 72 66 4.11 .11
19 1 80 78 75 3.94 3 77 77 72 4.10 .16
20 1 84 84 78 3.9 3 80 82 78 4.1 .2
21 2 89 86 83 3.95 3 83 87 84 4.13 .18
22 2 94 88 88 4, 2 89 89 84 4.04 .04
23 1 98 9^ 91 3.95 3 92 94 90 4.08 .13
24 2 103 96 96, 4 2 98 96 90 4.08 .08
25 1 107 102 99 3.95 3 101 101 96 4.04 .09
26 1 111 108 102 3.92 3 104 106 102 4.08 .16
27 2 116 110 107 3.97 3 107 111 108 4.11 .14
28 2 121 112 112 4. 2 113 113 108 4.03 .03
29 1 125 118 115 3.97 3 116 118 114 4.07 .10






S) 3 6 4
® 5 2 5
ROW SUM COL u SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V 3 T l T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 2 6 2 6. 6.
2 2 9 6 7 3. 2 12 k 6. 3.
3 2 12 12 11 3 067 3 3 16 9 5.33 1.66
4 2 15 18 15 3*75 1 9 19 14 4.75 1.
5 2 18 2k 19 3.6 1 15 22 19 4.4 .8
6 2 21 30 23 3c5 1 21 25 24 4.5 1.
7 2 24 36 27 3.57 1 27 28 29 4.14 .57
8 3 29 38 32 3.63 1 33 31 34 4.25 .62
9 3 34 40 37 3.78 1 39 34 39 4.33 .55
10 1 ko 40 40 4. 1 45 37 44 4.5 .5
11 1 k6 40 43 3.64 2 45 43 46 4.18 .54
12 3 51 42 48 3o5 2 45 49 48 4.08 .58
13 2 5^ 48 52 3.69 2 45 55 50 4.23 .54
11* 2 57 54 56 3.85 2 45 61 52 4.35 .50
15 2 60 60 60 4. 1 51 64 57 4.27 .27
16 2 63 66 64 3.94 1 57 67 62 4.18 .24
17 2 66 72 68 3.88 1 63 70 67 4.12 .24
18 2 69 78 72 3.83 1 69 73 72 4.05 .22
19 2 72 84 76 3.79 1 75 76 77 4.05 .26
20 3 77 86 81 3.85 1 81 79 82 4.1 .25
21 3 82 88 86 3.9 1 87 82 87 4.14 .24
22 1 88 88 89 4, 1 93 85 92 4.22 .22
23 1 9k 88 92 3.82 2 93 91 94 4.08 .26
24 3 99 90 97 3.75 2 93 97 96 4.03 .28
25 2 102 96 101 3.84 2 93 103 98 4.12 .26
26 2 105 102 105 3.92 2 93 109 100 4.19 .27
27 2 108 108 109 4. 1 99 112 105 4.14 .14
28 2 111 114 113 3.96 1 105 115 110 4.11 .15
29 2 114 120 117 3.93 1 111 118 115 4.07 .14





® o 6 3
© 6 3 4
® * 5 5
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 1 6 2 6, 6.
2 2 6 9 7 3. 1 12 4 6. 3.
3 2 12 12 11 3*67 3 3 16 9 5.33 1.66
k 2 18 15 15 3.75 2 9 19 14 4.75 1.
5 2 24 18 19 3.6 2 15 22 19 4.4 .8
6 2 30 21 23 3*5 2 21 25 24 4.17 .67
7 2 36 24 27 3.43 2 27 28 29 4,14 .71
8 3 38 29 32 3.62 2 33 31 34 4.25 .63
9 3 1*0 3k 37 3.78 2 39 34 39 4.33 .55
10 1 ko ko 40 4, 1 39 40 41 4,1 .1
11 3 k2 k5 45 3.82 1 39 46 43 4.17 .35
12 2 k8 k8 49 4 1 39 52 45 4.33 .33
13 2 & 51 53 3.92 2 45 55 50 4.23 .31
11* 2 60 5k 57 3.85 2 51 58 55 4.13 .28
15 2 66 57 61 3.79 2 57 61 60 4.06 .27
16 2 72 60 65 3.75 2 63 64 65 4.06 .31
17 3 74 65 70 3.82 2 69 67 70 4.12 .30
18 3 76 70 75 3.89 2 75 70 75 4.17 .28
19 1 76 76 78 k u 1 75 76 77 4.05 .05
20 3 78 81 83 3.9 1 75 82 79 4.1 .2
21 2 8k 84 87 4. 1 75 88 81 4.18 .18
22 2 90 87 91 3.95 2 81 91 86 4.13 .18
23 2 96 90 95 3.91 2 87 9^ 91 4.08 .17
24 2 102 93 99 3.87 2 93 97 96 4.03 .16
25 2 108 96 103 3.84 2 99 100 101 4.03 .19
26 3 110 101 108 3.88 1 99 106 103 4.07 .19
27 2 116 104 112 3.85 2 105 109 108 4.03 .18
28 2 122 107 116 3.82 2 111 112 113 4.03 .21
29 3 124 112 121 3.86 2 117 115 118 4.07 .21





(11 6 3 4
© o 6 3
® 2 5 5
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V 3 Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 k 3. 2 3 6 5 6. 3.
2 2 6 9 7 3c 1 9 6 7 4.5 1.5
3 1 12 12 11 3o67 3 13 9 12 4.33 .66
4 1 18 15 15 3c75 2 16 15 17 4.25 .5
5 3 20 20 20 4. 1 22 15 19 4.4 .4
6 1 26 23 2k 3c83 2 25 21 24 4.17 .?k
7 1 32 26 28 3o71 2 28 27 29 4.13 .42
8 3 3^ 31 33 3o87 2 31 33 34 4.25 .38
9 3 36 36 .38 4 1 37 33 36 4.11 .11
10 1 42 39 42 3.9 2 40 39 41 4.1 .2
11 3 44 kk ^7 4, 1 46 39 43 4.18 .18
12 1 50 k? 51 3-92 2 49 45 48 4.08 .16
13 1 56 .50 55 3*85 2 52 51 53 4.07 .22
14 3 .58 55 60 3.93 2 55 57 58 4.13 .20
15 3 60 60 65 4. 1 61 57 60 4.06 .06
16 1 66 63 69 3.93 2 64 63 65 4.08 .15
17 3 68 68 74 4. 1 70 63 67 4.12 .12
18 1 7k 71 78 3.95 2 73 69 72 4.05 .10
19 1 80 7k 82 3.89 2 76 75 77 4.05 .16
20 3 82 79 87 3.95 2 73 81 82 4.1 .15
21 3 8k 84 92 4, 1 8.5 81 84 4.05 .05
22 1 90 87 96 3.96 2 88 87 89 4.04 .08
23 3 92 92 101 4, 1 94 87 91 4.08 .08
24 1 98 95 105 3.95 2 97 93 96 4.03 .08
25 1 104 98 109 3.92 2 100 99 101 4.03 .11
26 3 106 103 114 3.96 2 103 105 106 4.07 .11
27 3 108 108 119 4. 1 109 105 108 4.03 .03
28 1 114 111 123 3.96 2 112 111 113 4.03 .07
29 3 116 116 128 4. 1 118 111 115 4.06 .06





© o 6 3
2 2 5 5
$ 6 3 4
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 1 2 6 6. 6.
2 3 6 9 7 3o 1 4 12 6. 3.
3 3 12 12 11 4„ 3 3 9 16 5.33 1.33
4 3 18 15 15 3.75 2 9 14 19 4.75 1.
5 3 2k 18 19 3.6 2 15 19 22 4,4 .8
6 3 30 21 23 3*5 2 21 24 25 4.18 .68
7 3 36 24 27 3.43 2 27 29 28 4.14 .71
8 2 38 29 32 3o63 2 33 34 31 4.25 .62
9 2 1*0 3k 37 3c78 2 39 39 34 4.33 .55
10 1 ko ko 40 4. 1 39 4l 40 4.1 .1
11 2 k2 k5 45 3<>8l 1 39 43 46 4.18 .37
12 3 k8 k8 49 4, 1 39 45 52 4.33 .33
13 3 5k 51 53 3.92 2 45 50 55 4.23 .31
14 3 60 5k 57 3.86 2 51 55 58 4.14 .28
15 3 66 57 61 3c8 2 57 60 61 4.07 .27
16 3 72 60 65 3o75 2 63 65 6k 4.06 .31
17 2 7k 65 70 3.82 2 69 70 67 4.11 .39
18 2 76 70 75 3.89 2 75 75 70 4.17 .28
19 1 76 76 78 4„ 1 75 77 76 4.05 .05
20 2 78 81 83 3.9 1 75 79 82 4.1 .2
21 3 8k 8k 87 4. 1 75 81 88 4.19 .19
22 1 8k 90 90 3.82 1 75 83 94 4.27 .45
23 3 90 93 94 3.91 1 75 85 100 4.35 .44
24 3 96 96 98 4. 1 75 87 106 4.42 .42
25 3 102 99 102 3.96 2 81 92 109 4.36 .40
26 3 108 102 106 3.93 2 87 97 112 4.31 .38
27 3 114 105 110 3.89 2 93 102 115 4.26 .37
28 3 120 108 114 3.86 2 99 107 118 4.22 .36
29 3 126 111 118 3.83 2 105 112 121 4.17 .34





® 6 3 4
© 2 5 5
© o 6 3
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 4 3. 2 3 5 6 6. 3.
2 3 6 9 7 3. 1 9 7 6 4.5 1.5
3 1 12 12 11 3.67 3 13 12 9 4.33 .66
4 1 18 15 15 3.75 2 16 17 15 4.25 .5
5 2 20 20 20 4, 1 22 19 15 4.4 .4
6 1 26 23 24 3.83 2 25 24 21 4.18 .35
7 1 32 26 28 3.71 2 28 29 27 4.14 .43
8 2 34 31 33 3.88 2 31 34 33 4.25 .37
9 2 36 36 38 4. 1 37 36 33 4.11 .11
10 1 42 39 42 3.9 2 40 41 39 4.1 .2
11 2 44 kk 47 4. 1 46 43 39 4.18 .18
12 1 50 u7 51 3.91 2 49 48 45 4.08 .17
13 1 56 50 55 3.84 2 52 53 51 4.07 .23
14 2 58 55 60 3.93 2 55 58 57 4.14 .21
15 2 60 60 65 4. 1 61 60 57 4.06 .06
16 1 66 63 69 3.93 2 64 65 63 4.06 .13
17 2 68 68 7k 4. 1 70 67 63 4.12 .12
18 1 7k 71 78 3.94 2 73 72 69 4.06 .12
19 1 80 7k 82 3.89 2 76 77 75 4.05 .16
20 2 82 79 87 3.95 2 79 82 81 4.1 .15
21 2 8k 84 92 4, 1 85 84 81 4.04 .04
22 1 90 87 96 3.95 2 88 89 87 4.04 .09
23 2 92 92 101 4. 1 94 91 87 4.08 .08
24 1 98 95 105 3.96 2 97 96 93 4.03 .07
25 1 104 98 109 3.92 2 100 101 99 4.03 .11
26 2 106 103 114 3.96 2 103 106 105 4.08 .12
27 2 108 108 119 4. 1 109 108 105 4.03 .03
28 1 114 111 123 3.97 2 112 113 111 4.03 .06
29 2 116 116 128 4. 1 118 115 111 4.07 .07






2) 6 4 3
® 2 5 5
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 1 6 2 6. 6.
2 2 6 7 9 3. 1 12 4 6. 3.
3 2 12 11 12 3.67 2 3 16 9 5.33 1.66
k 2 18 15 15 3o75 2 6 20 14 5. 1.25
5 2 2k 19 18 3c6 3 12 23 19 4,6 1.
6 2 30 23 21 3.5 3 18 26 24 4.33 .83
7 2 36 27 24 3.43 3 24 29 29 4.14 .71
8 2 42 31 27 3.38 3 30 32 34 4.25 .87
9 3 kk 36 32 3.55 3 36 35 39 4.33 .78
10 3 46 41 37 3.7 3 42 38 44 4.4 .70
11 3 48 46 42 3.81 3 48 41 49 4.45 .64
12 3 50 51 47 3.91 3 54 44 54 4.5 .59
13 1 50 54 53 3.85 l 54 50 56 4.31 .46
14 3 52 59 58 3.71 1 54 56 58 4.14 .43
15 3 54 64 63 3.6 1 54 62 60 4.13 .53
16 2 60 68 66 3.75 1 54 68 62 4.24 .49
17 2 66 72 69 3.88 1 54 74 64 4.35 .47
18 2 72 76 72 4. 1 54 80 66 4.44 .44
19 2 78 80 75 3.95 3 60 83 71 4.36 .41
20 2 84 84 78 3.9 3 66 86 76 4.3 .4
21 2 90 88 81 3.85 3 72 89 81 4.23 .38
22 2 96 92 84 3.81 3 78 92 86 4.18 .37
23 2 102 96 87 3.78 3 84 95 91 4.13 .35
24 2 108 100 90 3.75 3 90 98 96 4.08 .33
25 2 114 104 93 3.72 3 96 101 101 4.04 .32
26 2 120 108 96 3.69 3 102 104 106 4.07 .38
27 1-^ 122 113 101 3.74 3 108 107 111 4.11 .37
28 3 124 118 106 3.79 3 114 110 116 4.14 .35
29 3 126 123 111 3.83 3 120 113 121 4.17 .34





$) 6 4 3
(2) 3 6
® 2 5 5
ROW SUM C0L„ SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V 3 Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 4 3 3o 3 3 6 5 6. 3.
2 2 6 7 9 3c 1 9 6 7 4,5 1.5
3 1 12 11 12 3o67 2 13 9 12 4.33 .66
1* 1 18 15 15 3o75 2 17 12 17 4 25 .5
5 1 2k 19 18 3.6 3 20 18 22 4.4 1.
6 3 26 2k 23 3.83 3 23 24 27 4.5 .67
7 3 28 29 28 k. 1 29 24 29 4.13 .13
8 1 34 33 31 3c87 3 32 30 34 4.25 .38
9 3 36 38 36 4. 1 38 30 36 4.22 .22
10 1 k2 k2 39 3c9 3 41 36 41 4.1 .2
11 1 k8 k6 42 3o82 3 44 42 46 4.18 .36
12 3 50 51 k7 3o92 3 47 48 51 4.25 .33
13 3 52 56 52 4. 1 53 48 53 4.08 .08
14 1 58 60 55 3»93 3 56 54 58 4.13 .20
15 3 60 65 60 4. 1 62 54 60 4.13 .13
16 1 66 69 63 3.93 3 65 60 65 4.06 .13
17 1 72 73 66 3o88 3 68 66 70 4.11 .23
18 3 74 78 71 3.95 3 71 72 75 4.16 .21
19 3 76 83 76 4, 1 77 72 77 4.05 .05
20 1 82 87 79 3c95 3 80 78 82 4.1 .15
21 3 8k 92 8k 4. 1 86 78 84 4.08 .08
22 1 90 96 8? 3.96 3 89 84 89 4.04 .08
23 1 96 100 90 3c9l 3 92 90 94 4.08 .17
24 3 98 105 95 3.96 3 95 96 99 4.12 .16
25 3 100 110 100 4, 1 101 96 101 4.03 .03
26 1 106 114 103 3o96 3 104 102 106 4.07 .11
27 3 108 119 108 4. 1 110 102 108 4.07 .07
28 1 114 123 111 3*96 3 113 108 113 4.03 .07
29 1 120 127 114 3.93 3 116 114 118 4.07 .14






2 2 5 5
3 6 4 3
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 1 2 6 6. 6.
2 3 6 7 9 3o 1 4 12 6. 3.
3 3 12 11 12 3.67 2 3 9 16 5.33 1.66
4 3 18 15 15 3.75 2 6 14 20 5. 1.25
5 3 24 19 18 3c6 3 12 19 23 4.6 1.
6 3 30 23 21 3.5 3 18 24 26 4.33 .83
7 3 36 27 24 3.43 3 24 29 29 4.14 .71
8 2 38 32 29 3.63 2 27 34 33 4,25 .62
9 2 40 37 34 3*77 3 33 39 36 4.33 .56
10 2 k2 42 39 3.9 3 39 44 39 4.4 .5
11 2 kk 47 44 4. 1 39 46 45 4.18 .18
12 2 k6 52 49 3.83 1 39 48 51 4.25 .42
13 3 52 56 52 4 1 39 50 57 4.39 .39
14 3 58 60 55 3.93 3 k$ 55 60 4.28 .35
15 3 6k 64 58 3.86 3 51 60 63 4.2 .34
16 3 70 68 61 3.8 3 57 65 66 4.12 .32
17 3 76 72 64 3.76 3 63 70 69 4.11 .35
18 2 78 77 69 3.83 3 69 75 72 4.17 .34
19 2 80 82 74 3.89 3 75 80 75 4.21 .32
20 2 82 87 79 3.94 3 81 85 78 4.24 .3
21 2 8k 92 84 4. 1 8l 87 84 4.14 .14
22 2 86 97 89 3-91 1 81 89 90 4.08 .17
23 3 92 101 92 4. 1 81 91 96 4.17 .17
24 3 98 105 95 3.96 3 87 96 99 4.12 .16
25 3 104 109 98 3.91 3 93 101 102 4.08 .17
26 3 110 113 101 3 88 3 99 106 105 4.08 .2
27 2 112 118 106 3.93 3 105 111 108 4.11 .18
28 2 114 123 111 3.96 3 111 116 111 4.14 .18
29 2 116 128 116 4, 1 111 118 117 4.07 .07





(1) 6 4 3
2 5 5
® o 3 6
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 k 3 3» 3 3 5 6 6, 3.
2 3 6 7 9 3. 1 9 7 6 4»5 1.5
3 1 12 11 12 3.67 2 13 12 9 4.33 .66
4 1 18 15 15 3.75 2 17 17 12 4.25 .5
5 1 2k 19 18 3c6 3 20 22 18 4,4 .8
6 2 26 2k 23 3.82 3 23 27 24 4,5 .68
7 2 28 29 28 4. 1 29 29 24 4,14 .14
8 1 34 33 31 3.88 3 32 34 30 4,2.5 .37
9 2 36 38 36 4. 1 38 36 30 4,22 .22
10 1 k2 k2 39 3.9 3 41 41 36 4,1 .2
11 1 k8 k6 k2 3 c 82 3 44 46 42 4,18 .36
12 2 50 51 k7 3.92 3 47 51 48 4,25 .33
13 2 52 56 52 4. 1 53 53 48 4.07 .07
14 1 58 60 55 3.93 3 56 58 54 4.14 .21
15 2 60 65 60 4, 1 62 60 54 4.13 .13
16 1 66 69 63 3.94 3 65 65 60 4.06 .12
17 1 72 73 66 3 c 88 3 68 70 66 4.12 .24
18 2 74 78 71 3c94 3 71 75 72 4.17 .23
19 2 76 83 76 4. 1 77 77 72 4,05 .05
20 1 82 87 79 3.95 3 80 82 78 4,1 .15
21 2 8k 92 8k 4. 1 86 84 78 4.09 .09
22 1 90 96 87 3.95 3 89 89 84 4.04 .09
23 1 96 100 90 3.91 3 92 94 90 4.08 .17
24 2 98 105 95 3.96 3 95 99 96 4.12 .16
25 2 100 110 100 4. 1 101 101 96 4.03 .03
26 1 106 114 103 3.97 3 104 106 102 4,07 .10
27 2 108 119 108 4. 1 110 108 102 4,07 .07
28 1 114 123 111 3.96 3 113 113 108 4.03 .07
29 1 120 12? 114 3.93 3 116 118 114 4.07 .14






• U 3 6
® 5 5 2
ROW SUM COLo SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 3 6 2 6. 6.
2 2 7 9 6 3o 3 12 4 6. 3.
3 2 11 12 12 3o67 1 3 16 9 5.33 1.66
4 2 15 15 18 3o75 1 6 20 14 5. 1.25
5 2 19 18 24 3.6 2 12 23 19 4,6 1.
6 2 23 21 30 3.5 2 18 26 24 4.33 .88
7 2 27 24 36 3o43 2 24 29 29 4,14 .71
8 2 31 27 42 3o87 2 30 32 34 4.5 .63
9 3 36 32 44 3.55 2 36 36 39 4,33 .78
10 3 4l 37 46 3.7 2 42 39 44 4 C 4 .7
11 3 46 42 48 3.81 2 48 42 49 4,45 .64
12 3 51 47 50 3.92 2 54 45 54 4,5 .58
13 1 54 53 50 3.84 3 54 51 56 4,31 .47
14 3 59 58 52 3o71 3 54 57 58 4,14 .43
15 3 64 63 54 3.6 3 54 63 60 4,2 .6
16 2 68 66 60 3.75 3 54 69 62 4,32 .57
17 2 72 69 66 3.88 3 54 75 64 4,42 .54
18 2 76 72 72 4. 2 60 78 69 4,33 .33
19 2 80 75 78 3.95 2 66 81 74 4,26 .31
20 2 84 78 84 3.9 2 72 84 79 4,2 .3
21 2 88 81 90 3.85 2 78 87 84 4,13 .28
22 2 92 84 96 3.81 2 84 90 89 4,08 .27
23 2 96 87 102 3.78 2 90 93 94 4,08 .30
24 3 101 92 104 3.83 2 96 96 99 4.13 .30
25 3 106 97 106 3.88 2 102 99 104 4.17 .29
26 3 111 102 108 3.92 2 108 102 109 4.19 .27
27 3 116 107 110 3.96 2 114 105 114 4.22 .26
28 1 119 113 110 3.93 3 114 111 116 4.14 .21
29 3 124 118 112 3.86 3 114 117 118 4,07 .21






D 5 5 2
© U 3 6
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 3 2 6 6. 6.
2 3 7 9 6 3. 3 4 12 6. 3.
3 3 11 12 12 3.67 1 3 9 16 5.33 1.66
4 3 15 15 18 3.75 1 6 14 20 5. 1.25
5 3 19 18 24 3*6 2 12 19 23 4.6 1.
6 3 23 21 30 3.5 2 18 24 26 4.33 .83
7 3 27 2k 36 3.43 2 24 29 29 4.14 .71
8 2 32 29 38 3.63 2 30 34 32 4.25 .62
9 2 37 3k 40 3.78 2 36 39 35 4.33 .55
10 2 k2 39 42 3.9 2 42 44 38 4.4 .5
11 2 k7 44 44 4, 2 48 49 41 4.45 .45
12 2 .52 49 46 3o83 3 48 51 47 4.25 .47
13 2 57 54 48 3.69 3 48 53 53 4.07 .38
14 2 62 59 50 3.57 3 48 55 59 4.21 .64
15 3 66 62 56 3.73 3 48 57 65 4.33 .60
16 3 70 65 62 3.87 3 48 59 71 4.43 .56
17 3 74 68 68 4. 2 54 64 74 4.35 .35
18 3 78 71 74 3.95 2 60 69 77 4.27 .32
19 3 82 74 80 3.89 2 66 74 80 4.21 .32
20 3 86 77 86 3.85 2 72 79 83 4.15 .30
21 3 90 80 92 3.81 2 78 84 86 4.1 .29
22 3 9k 83 98 3.77 2 84 89 89 4.04 .27
23 2 99 88 100 3.83 2 90 94 92 4.08 .25
24 2 104 93 102 3.87 2 96 99 95 4.12 .25
25 2 109 98 104 3.92 2 102 104 98 4.17 .25
26 2 114 103 106 3.96 2 108 109 101 4.19 .23
27 2 119 108 108 4. 2 114 114 104 4.22 .22
28 1 122 114 108 3.87 3 114 116 110 4.14 .27
29 2 127 119 110 3.79 3 114 118 116 4.07 .28





V k 3 6
® 5 5 2
® 3 6
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T 2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 k 3 6 3. 2 3 5 6 6. 3.
2 3 7 9 6 3. 3 9 7 6 4.5 1.5
3 1 11 12 12 367 1 13 12 9 4.33 .66
4 1 15 15 18 3.75 1 17 17 12 4.25 .5
5 1 19 18 24 3.6 2 20 22 18 4.4 .8
6 2 2k 23 26 3.83 2 23 27 24 4.5 .67
7 2 29 28 28 4, 2 26 32 30 4.57 .43
8 2 34 33 30 3.75 3 32 34 30 4.25 .5
9 2 39 38 32 3*33 3 38 36 30 4.22 .89
10 1 43 41 38 3,8 3 44 38 30 4.4 .6
11 1 k7 44 44 4. 2 47 43 36 4.26 .26
12 1 51 47 50 3.92 2 50 48 42 4.18 .26
13 1 55 50 56 3.85 2 53 53 48 4.08 .23
14 1 59 53 62 3.78 2 56 58 54 4.14 .36
15 2 64 58 64 3.87 2 59 63 60 4.2 .33
16 3 69 63 66 3.94 2 62 68 66 4.24 .3
17 2 7^ 68 68 4. 2 65 73 72 4.28 .28
18 2 79 73 70 3.89 3 71 75 72 4.17 .28
19 2 84 78 72 3.78 3 77 77 72 4.06 .28
20 1 88 81 78 3.9 3 83 79 72 4.15 .25
21 1 92 84 84 k. 2 86 84 78 4.09 .09
22 1 96 87 90 3.95 2 89 89 84 4.04 .09
23 1 100 90 96 3.91 2 92 94 90 4 C 08 .17
24 2 105 95 98 3.95 2 95 99 96 4.12 .17
25 2 110 100 100 4. 2 98 104 102 4.17 .17
26 2 115 105 102 3.92 3 104 106 102 4„07 .15
27 2 120 110 104 3.85 3 110 108 102 4.07 .22
28 1 124 113 110 3.93 3 116 110 102 4.14 .21
29 1 128 116 116 4. 2 119 115 108 4.1 .1






D 5 2 5
® » 6 3
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 2 2 6 6. 6.
2 3 7 6 9 3. 2 4 12 6. 3.
3 3 11 12 12 3.67 1 3 9 16 5.33 2.66
4 3 15 18 15 3.75 1 6 14 20 5. 1.25
5 3 19 24 18 3.6 3 12 19 23 4.6 1.
6 3 23 30 21 3.5 3 18 24 26 4.33 .83
7 3 27 36 24 3.43 3 24 29 29 4,14 .71
8 2 32 38 29 3o63 3 30 34 32 4,25 .62
9 2 37 40 34 3.78 3 36 39 35 4.33 .55
10 2 42 42 39 3.9 3 42 44 38 4.4 .5
11 2 47 44 44 4. 2 42 46 44 4.18 .18
12 2 52 46 49 3.84 2 42 48 50 4.16 .32
13 3 56 52 52 4. 2 42 50 56 4,31 .31
14 3 60 58 55 3.93 3 48 55 59 4,21 .28
15 3 64 64 58 3.87 3 54 60 62 4.12 .25
16 3 68 70 •61 3.81 3 60 65 65 4.06 .25
17 2 73 72 66 3.88 3 66 70 68 4.12 .24
18 2 78 74 71 3.94 3 72 75 71 4.17 .23
19 2 83 76 76 4„ 2 72 77 77 4.06 .06
20 2 88 78 81 3.9 2 72 79 83 4.15 .25
21 3 92 84 84 4, 2 72 81 89 4,23 .23
22 3 96 90 87 3.96 3 78 86 92 4.18 .22
23 3 100 96 90 3.91 3 84 91 95 4.13 .22
24 3 104 102 93 3.87 3 90 96 98 4.08 .21
25 3 108 108 96 3.8U 3 96 101 101 4.04 .20
26 2 113 110 101 3.89 3 102 106 104 4.08 .19
27 2 118 112 106 3.92 3 108 111 107 4.12 .20
28 2 123 114 111 3.97 2 108 113 113 4.03 .06
29 2 128 116 116 4. 2 108 115 119 4.1 .1






2) 4 6 3
(5) 5 2 5
ROW SUM COLo SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 2 6 2 6. 6.
2 2 7 6 9 3. 2 12 4 6. 3.
3 2 11 12 12 3.67 1 3 16 9 5.33 1.66
1* 2 15 18 15 3*75 1 6 20 14 5. 1.25
5 2 19 24 18 3.6 3 12 23 19 4,6 1.
6 2 23 30 21 3.5 3 18 26 24 4.33 .83
7 2 27 36 24 3*43 3 24 29 29 4.l4 .71
8 2 31 42 27 3.37 3 30 32 34 4.25 .88
9 3 36 44 32 3.56 3 36 35 39 4.33 .77
10 3 41 46 37 3.7 3 42 38 44 4.4 .7
11 3 46 48 42 3.82 3 48 4l 49 4.45 .63
12 3 51 50 47 3.92 3 54 44 54 4.5 .58
13 1 54 50 53 3.84 2 54 50 56 4,31 .47
Ik 3 59 52 58 3.71 2 54 56 58 4,14 .43
15 2 63 58 61 3.87 2 54 62 60 4.13 .26
16 2 67 64 64 4. 2 54 68 62 4,25 .25
17 2 71 70 67 3.94 3 60 71 .67 4.17 .23
18 2 75 76 70 3.89 3 66 74 72 4.11 .22
19 2 79 82 73 3.84 3 72 77 77 4.05 .21
20 2 83 88 76 3.8 3 78 80 82 4.1 .2
21 3 88 90 81 3.85 3 84 83 87 4.13 .28
22 3 93 92 86 3.91 3 90 86 92 4.18 .27
23 3 98 94 91 3.95 3 96 89 97 4.22 .27
21* 3 103 96 96 4. 2 96 95 99 4.12 .12
25 3 108 98 101 3.91 2 96 101 101 4.03 .12
26 2 112 104 104 4. 2 96 107 103 4.12 .12
27 2 116 110 107 3.96 3 102 110 108 4,07 .11
28 2 120 116 110 3.93 3 108 113 113 4.03 .10
29 2 124 122 113 3.90 3 114 116 118 4.07 .17





© k 6 3
® 3 6
® 5 2 5
HOW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 k 6 3 3o 3 3 6 5 6. 3.
2 2 7 6 9 3o 2 9 6 7 4.5 1.5
3 1 11 12 12 3.66 1 13 9 12 4.33 .66
4 1 15 18 15 3.75 1 17 12 17 4.25 .5
5 1 19 2k 18 3o6 3 20 18 22 4.4 .8
6 3 2k 26 23 3.83 3 23 24 27 4.5 .67
7 3 29 28 28 4. 2 29 24 29 4.14 .14
8 1 33 34 31 3.88 3 32 30 34 4.25 .37
9 3 38 36 36 4, 2 38 30 36 4.22 .22
10 1 k2 k2 39 3.9 3 kl 36 41 4.1 .2
11 1 kG 48 k2 3.82 3 kk 42 46 4.18 .36
12 3 51 50 k7 3.92 3 k7 48 51 •4.25 .33
13 3 56 52 52 4. 2 53 48 53 4.07 .07
14 1 60 58 55 3.93 3 56 54 58 4.14 .21
15 3 65 60 60 4. 2 62 54 60 4.13 .13
16 l 69 66 63 3.9*+ 3 65 60 65 4.06 .12
17 1 73 72 66 3.88 3 68 66 70 4.12 .24
18 3 78 7k 71 3.9^ 3 71 72 75 4.17 .23
19 3 83 76 76 4. 2 77 72 77 4.06 .06
20 1 87 82 79 3.95 3 80 78 82 4.1 .15
21 3 92 8k 8k 4. 2 86 78 84 4.09 .09
22 1 96 90 87 3.96 3 89 84 89 4.03 .07
23 1 100 96 90 3.91 3 92 90 94 4.08 .17
24 3 105 98 95 3.96 3 95 96 99 4.12 .16
25 3 110 100 100 4. 2 101 96 101 4.04 .04
26 1 Ilk 106 103 3.96 3 104 102 106 4.07 .11
27 3 119 108 108 4, 2 110 102 108 4.07 .07
28 1 123 11** 111 3.97 3 113 108 113 4.03 .06
29 1 127 120 114 3.93 3 116 114 118 4.07 .14









ROW SUM COL SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 5 2 5 2, 2 2 6 6. 4.
2 2 9 8 8 if, 2 4 12 6, 2.
3 2 13 14 11 3.!67 3 9 15 6 5o 1.33
4 3 16 14 17 3< 5 2 11 21 6 5.25 1.75
5 2 20 20 20 4, 1 16 25 9 5. 1,
6 2 24 26 23 3. 82 3 21 28 15 4.67 »85
7 2 28 32 26 3..71 3 26 31 21 4.43 .72
8 2 32 38 29 3.,62 3 31 34 27 4.25 .63
9 2 36 44 32 3* 55 3 36 37 33 4.11 .56
10 2 4o 50 35 3..5 3 41 ko 39 4.1 .6
11 1 k5 52 4o 3<,63 3 46 43 45 4.18 .55
12 1 50 54 45 3. 75 3 51 46 51 4.25 .5
13 1 55 56 50 3.,84 3 56 49 57 4.39 c55
14 3 58 56 56 4, t 2 58 55 57 4.13 .13
15 1 63 58 61 3.,84 2 60 61 57 4.06 .22
16 2 67 64 64 4. 2 62 67 57 4.18 .18
17 2 71 70 67 3.,94 3 67 70 63 4.12 .18
18 2 75 76 70 3.,89 3 72 73 69 4.06 ol7
19 2 79 82 73 3.,84 3 77 76 75 4.05 .21
20 1 84 84 78 3.>9 3 82 79 81 4.1 .2
21 1 89 86 83 3. 94 3 87 82 87 4.13 .19
22 1 94 88 88 4, 2 89 88 87 4.04 .04
23 1 99 90 93 3.,91 2 91 94 87 4.08 .17
24 2 103 96 96 4, ) 2 93 100 87 4.17 .17
25 2 107 102 99 3.,96 3 98 103 93 4.12 .16
26 2 111 108 102 3,,93 3 103 106 99 4.08 .15
27 2 115 114 105 3 ,89 3 108 109 105 4.03 .14
28 2 119 120 108 3.,85 3 113 112 111 4.03 .18
29 1 121* 122 113 3 ,89 3 118 115 117 4.07 .18






2 3 4 6
3) 5 5 2
ROW SUM COL SUM
N i T l T2 T 3 V 3 T l T2 T 3 V V - V
1 1 6 3 3 6 2 6. 6,
2 2 9 7 6 3. 3 12 4 6, 3.
3 2 12 11 12 3.67 2 3 16 9 5.33 2,67
4 2 15 15 18 3.75 1 9 19 14 4,75 1 .
5 2 18 19 2k 3.6 1 15 22 19 4.4 ,8
6 2 21 23 30 3.5 1 21 25 24 4,18 .68
7 2 2k 27 36 3.43 1 27 28 29 4,14 .71
8 3 29 32 38 3.63 1 33 31 34 4,25 ,62
9 3 34 37 ko 3*77 1 39 34 39 4,33 .56
10 1 ko ko ko 4. 1 45 37 kk 4,5 .5
11 1 k6 43 ko 3.64 3 45 43 46 4,18 .54
12 3 51 k8 k2 3o5 3 45 49 48 4,08 ,58
13 2 54 52 k8 3 c 69 3 45 55 50 4,23 .54
14 2 57 56 5k 3.85 3 45 61 52 4,36 .51
15 2 60 60 60 4. 1 51 64 57 4,27 .25
16 2 63 6k 66 3.94 1 57 67 62 4,18 .24
17 2 66 68 72 3.88 1 63 70 67 4,12 .24
18 2 69 72 78 3. 84 1 69 73 72 4,06 .20
19 2 72 76 8k 3.78 1 75 76 77 4,05 .27
20 3 77 81 86 3.85 1 81 79 82 4,10 .25
21 3 82 86 88 3.90 1 87 82 87 4,14 .24
22 1 88 89 88 4 1 93 85 92 4,22 .22
23 1 9k 92 88 3c82 3 93 91 94 4,08 .20
24 3 99 97 90 3.75 3 93 97 96 4,03 .28
25 2 102 101 96 3.84 3 93 103 98 4,12 .28
26 2 105 105 102 3.93 3 93 109 100 4,18 .25
27 2 108 109 108 4, 1 99 112 105 4,14 .14
28 2 111 113 114 3c96 1 105 115 110 4,11 .15
29 2 114 117 120 3.93 1 111 118 115 4,07 .14






2 5 5 2
3 3 4 6
HOW SUM C0L„ SUM
N i Tl T2 T 3 V J T l T2 T 3 V V
- V
1 1 6 3 3 2 6 6. 6.
2 3 9 7 6 3. 3 k 12 6. 3.
3 3 12 11 12 3.67 2 3 9 16 5.33 2.67
4 3 15 15 18 3.75 1 9 14 19 4.75 1.
5 3 18 19 24 3.6 1 15 19 22 4.4 .8
6 3 21 23 30 3.5 1 21 24 25 4.17 .67
7 3 24 27 36 3.42 1 27 29 28 4.14 .72
8 2 29 32 38 3.63 1 33 34 31 4.25 .62
9 2 34 37 40 3.78 1 39 39 34 4.33 .55
10 1 ko ko 40 4, 1 45 44 37 4.5 .5
11 1 46 43 40 3.64 3 45 46 43 4.18 .54
12 2 51 48 42 3.5 3 45 48 49 4.08 .58
13 3 54 52 48 3.69 3 45 50 55 4.23 .54
111 3 57 56 54 3.85 3 45 52 61 4.35 .5
15 3 60 60 60 4. l 51 57 64 4.27 .27
16 3 63 64 66 3.94 1 57 62 67 4.18 .2k
17 3 66 68 72 3.87 1 63 67 70 4.11 .24
18 3 69 72 78 3.83 1 69 72 73 4.06 .23
19 3 72 76 84 3<>79 1 75 77 76 4.05 26
20 2 77 81 86 3.85 1 81 82 79 4.10 .25
21 2 82 86 88 3.90 1 87 87 82 4.13 .23
22 1 88 89 88 4. 1 93 92 85 4.22 .22
23 1 94 92 88 3.82 3 93 94 91 4.08 .20
2k 2 99 97 90 3o75 3 93 96 97 4.03 .28
25 3 102 101 96 3.84 3 93 98 103 4.13 .29
26 3 105 105 102 3.93 3 93 100 109 4.19 .26
27 3 108 109 108 4. 1 99 105 112 4.15 .15
28 3 111 113 114 3.96 1 105 110 115 4.11 .15
29 3 114 117 120 3.93 1 111 115 118 4.10 .17





D 3 k 6
2^ 5 5 2
3^ 6 3
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T 2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 k 6 3. 1 3 5 6 6. 3.
2 3 9 7 6 3o 3 9 7 6 4.5 1.5
3 1 12 11 12 3 067 2 13 12 9 4.33 .66
k 1 15 15 18 3»75 1 16 17 15 4.25 .5
5 2 20 20 20 4, 1 19 22 21 k.k .4
6 2 25 25 22 3 067 3 25 2k 21 4.17 .4
7 1 28 29 28 4. 1 28 29 27 4.14 .14
8 2 33 34 30 3.75 3 34 31 27 4.12 .37
9 1 36 38 36 4, 1 37 36 33 4.11 .11
10 1 39 k2 42 3.9 1 ko 41 39 4.1 .2
11 2 44 47 kk 4„ 1 43 46 45 4.18 .18
12 2 49 52 k6 3.82 3 49 48 45 4.08 .2
13 1 52 56 52 4, 1 52 53 51 4.07 .07
Ik 2 57 61 5k 3.85 3 58 55 51 4.14 .29
15 1 60 65 60 4. 1 61 60 57 4.06 .06
16 1 63 69 66 3.94 1 64 65 63 4.07 .13
17 2 68 7^ 68 4. 1 67 70 69 4.12 .12
18 2 73 79 70 3.88 3 73 72 69 4.05 .17
19 1 76 83 76 4. 1 76 77 75 4.05 .05
20 2 81 88 78 3.9 3 82 79 75 4.1 .2
21 1 8k 92 8k 4, 1 85 8k 81 4.04 .ok
22 1 87 96 90 3.95 1 88 89 87 4.03 .08
23 2 92 101 92 4. 1 91 9k 93 4.08 .08
2k 2 97 106 94 3.91 3 97 96 93 4.03 .12
25 1 100 110 100 4. 1 100 101 99 4.03 .03
26 2 105 115 102 3.92 3 106 103 99 4.07 .15
27 1 108 119 108 4. 1 109 108 105 4.03 .03
28 1 111 123 114 3.97 1 112 113 111 4.03 .06
29 2 116 128 116 4. 1 115 118 117 4.07 .07





l 3 if 6
2 6 3
3 5 5 2
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T 3 V V - V
1 1 3 if 6 3. 1 3 6 5 6. 3.
2 2 9 7 6 3. 3 9 6 7 if.
5
1.5
3 1 12 11 12 3.67 2 13 9 12 if. 33 .66
k 1 15 15 18 3o75 1 16 15 17 if .25 .5
5 3 20 20 20 U 1 19 21 22 if. i* .if
6 3 25 25 22 4.67 3 25 21 24 ifol7 .if
7 1 28 29 28 if. l 28 27 29 k.lk .lif
8 3 33 3k 30 3.75 3 3^ 27 31 if. 12 .37
9 1 36 38 36 k. 1 37 33 36 k ,11 .11
10 1 39 k2 k2 3.9 1 ifO 39 ifl if.l .2
11 3 kk if? kk J*. 1 if3 k5 if6 if. 18 .18
12 3 k9 52 kS 3 c 82 3 if9 k5 if8 if. 08 .2
13 1 52 56 52 if. 1 52 51 53 if. 07 .07
Ik 3 57 61 5k 3.85 3 58 51 55 k,lk .29
15 1 60 65 60 1*. 1 61 57 60 ifo06 .06
16 1 63 69 66 3.9^ 1 64 63 65 if .07 .13
17 3 68 7h 68 if. 1 67 69 70 if. 12 .12
18 3 73 79 70 3.88 3 73 69 72 if. 05 .17
19 1 76 83 76 4, 1 76 75 77 if. 05 .05
20 3 81 88 78 3.9 3 82 75 79 if.l .2
21 1 8k 92 81+ • if. 1 85 81 8k if.Oif .Oif
22 1 87 96 90 3.95 1 88 87 89 if. 03 .08
23 3 92 101 92 k„ 1 91 93 9if if. 08 .08
2k 3 97 106 9k 3.91 3 97 93 96 if. 03 .12
25 1 100 110 100 if. 1 100 99 101 if. 03 .03
26 3 10 5 115 102 3.92 3 106 99 103 if.07 .15
27 1 108 119 108 k> 1 109 105 108 k .03 .03
28 1 111 123 llif 3.97 1 112 ill 113 if. 03 .06
29 3 116 128 116 if. 1 115 117 118 if .07 .07






® 3 6 4
Z) 5 2 5
D 6 3
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V v - V
1 1 3 6 4 3. 1 3 5 6 6. 3.
2 3 9 6 7 3. 2 9 7 6 4.5 1.5
3 1 12 12 11 3.67 3 13 12 9 4.33 .66
4 1 15 18 15 3.75 1 16 17 15 4.25 .5
5 2 20 20 20 4. 1 19 22 21 4.4 .4
6 2 25 22 25 3o67 2 25 24 21 4.17 .5
7 1 28 28 29 4. 1 28 29 27 4.14 .14
8 2 33 30 34 3.75 2 34 31 27 4.25 .5
9 1 36 36 38 4. 1 37 36 33 4.11 .11
10 1 39 42 42 3.9 1 40 41 39 4.1 .2
11 2 44 44 47 4, 1 43 46 45 4.18 .18
12 2 49 46 52 3.83 2 49 48 45 4.08 .25
13 1 52 52 56 4, 1 52 53 51 4.03 .03
14 2 57 5^ 61 3c85 2 58 55 51 4.14 .29
15 1 60 60 65 4. 1 61 60 57 4.06 .06
16 1 63 66 69 3.94 1 64 65 63 4.07 .13
17 2 68 68 74 4. 1 67 70 69 4.11 .11
18 2 73 70 79 3.89 2 73 72 69 4.06 .17
19 1 76 76 83 4. 1 76 77 75 4.05 .05
20 2 81 78 88 3.9 2 82 73 75 4.1 .2
21 1 84 84 92 4. 1 85 84 81 4.05 .05
22 1 87 90 96 3.95 1 88 89 87 4.04 .09
23 2 92 92 101 4. 1 91 94 93 4.08 .08
24 2 97 94 106 3.91 2 97 96 93 4.03 .12
25 1 100 100 110 4. 1 100 101 99 4.03 .03
26 2 105 102 115 3.92 2 106 103 99 4.07 .15
27 1 108 108 119 4. 1 109 108 105 4.03 .03
28 1 111 114 123 3.97 1 112 113 111 4.03 .06
29 2 116 116 128 4. 1 115 118 117 4.07 .07





® 3 6 4
® 6 3
© ^ 2 5
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 3 6 4 3- 1 3 6 5 6, 3.
2 2 9 6 7 3. 2 9 6 7 4.5 1.5
3 1 12 12 11 3.67 3 13 9 12 4.33 .66
4 1 15 18 15 3o75 1 16 15 17 4.25 .5
5 3 20 20 20 4, 1 19 21 22 4,4 .4
6 3 25 22 25 3«67 2 25 21 24 4.17 .5
7 1 28 28 29 4, 1 28 27 29 4,14 .14
8 3 33 30 34 3.75 2 34 27 31 4.25 .5
9 1 36 36 38 4. 1 37 33 36 4 11 .11
10 1 39 42 42 3*9 1 40 39 4l 4 l .2
11 3 44 44 47 4. 1 43 45 46 4 l8 .18
12 3 49 46 52 3o83 2 49 45 48 4.08 .25
13 1 52 52 56 4. 1 52 51 53 4,03 .03
14 3 57 54 61 3o85 2 58 51 55 4.14 .29
15 1 60 60 65 4, 1 61 57 60 4.06 .06
16 1 63 66 69 3o94 1 64 63 65 4.07 .13
17 3 68 68 74 4. 1 67 69 70 4.11 .11
18 3 73 70 79 3.89 2 73 69 72 4.06 .17
19 1 76 76 83 4. 1 76 75 77 4.05 .05
20 3 8l 78 88 3»9 2 82 75 79 4.1 .2
21 1 84 84 92 4, 1 85 8l 84 4.05 .05
22 1 87 90 96 3o95 1 88 87 89 4.04 .09
23 3 92 92 101 4. 1 91 93 94 4.08 .08
24 3 97 94 106 3*91 2 97 93 96 4.03 .12
25 1 100 100 110 4, 1 100 99 101 4.03 .03
26 3 105 102 115 3.92 2 106 99 103 4.07 .15
27 1 108 108 119 4. 1 109 105 108 4.03 .03
28 1 111 114 123 3o97 1 112 111 113 4.03 .06
29 3 116 116 128 4, 1 115 117 118 4.07 .07





D 5 k 3
© 5 3 6
3) 2 6
ROW SUM COL. SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 5 k 3 3. 3 3 6 6. 3.
2 2 10 7 9 3>5 2 7 9 6 4.5 1
.
3 2 15 10 15 3o33 2 11 12 12 4. .67
k 2 20 13 21 3.25 2 15 15 18 4.5 1.25
5 3 22 19 21 3.8 2 19 18 24 4.8 1
6 3 2k 25 21 3.5 3 22 24 24 4. .5
7 2 29 28 27 3.86 3 25 30 24 4.28 .42
8 2 34 31 33 3.87 2 29 33 30 4.12 .25
9 2 39 34 39 3.77 2 33 36 36 4. .23
10 2 kk 37 k5 3.7 2 37 39 42 4.2 .5
11 3 k6 43 k5 3.91 2 ifl 42 48 4.37 .46
12 3 k8 k9 k5 3.75 3 44 48 48 4. .25
13 2 53 52 51 3.92 3 47 54 48 4,17 .25
14 2 58 53 57 3.79 2 51 57 54 4.07 .28
15 2 63 56 63 3o73 2 55 60 60 4„ .27
16 2 68 59 69 3.68 2 59 63 66 4.12 .44
17 3 70 65 69 3.82 2 63 66 72 4.23 .41
18 3 72 71 69 3.83 3 66 72 72 4. .17
19 2 77 7k 75 3.89 2 70 75 78 4,11 .22
20 3 79 80 75 3.75 3 73 81 78 4.05 .30
21 2 8k 83 81 3^85 3 76 87 78 4.14 .29
22 2 89 86 87 3.91 2 80 90 84 4.08 .17
23 2 94 89 93 3.87 2 84 93 90 4,04 .17
24 2 99 92 96 3.83 2 88 96 96 4. .17
25 2 104 95 102 3.8 2 92 99 102 4.08 .28
26 3 106 101 102 3.89 2 96 102 108 4,16 .27
27 3 108 107 102 3.78 3 99 108 108 4, .22
28 2 113 110 108 3.86 3 102 114 108 4,07 .21
29 2 118 113 114 3.9 2 106 117 114 4.03 .13





a 6 7 1
© 6 3 2
T 2 4 5
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V 3 Tl T2 T3 V V - V
1 1 6 7 1 1. 3 1 2 5 5. 4.
2 3 8 11 6 3c 3 2 4 10 5. 2.
3 3 10 15 11 3.33 1 8 10 12 4. .67
4 3 12 19 16 3. 1 14 16 14 4. 1.
5 2 18 22 18 3o6 1 20 22 16 4,4 .8
6 2 2k 25 20 3.33 3 21 24 21 k. .67
7 2 30 28 22 3d4 3 22 26 26 3.72 .58
8 2 36 31 2k 3. 3 23 28 31 3.87 .87
9 3 38 3 5 29 3o22 3 24 30 36 4, .78
10 3 ko 39 34 3.4 3 25 32 4l 4,1 .7
11 3 42 43 39 3.55 3 26 34 46 4,18 .63
12 3 kk k7 44 3.68 1 32 4o 48 4. .32
13 3 k6 51 49 3.57 1 38 46 50 3.85 .28
14 3 k8 55 54 3.^2 1 44 52 52 3.71 .29
15 2 5k 58 56 3.6 1 45 54 57 3.79 .19
16 3 56 62 61 3.49 1 51 60 59 3.75 ,26
17 2 56 65 63 3.29 1 57 66 61 3.88 .59
18 2 62 68 65 3.39 1 63 72 63 4, .61
19 2 68 71 67 3.52 3 64 74 68 3.88 .36
20 2 7k 7k 69 3.45 3 65 76 73 3.8 .35
21 2 80 77 71 3.37 3 66 78 78 3.71 .34
22 2 86 80 73 3.32 3 68 82 83 3.76 .44
23 3 88 8k 78 3.39 3 69 84 88 3.82 .43
24 3 90 88 83 3.46 3 70 86 93 3.87 ,4l
25 3 92 92 88 3.51 3 71 88 98 3.91 .40
26 3 94 96 93 3.58 3 73 92 103 3.96 .38
27 3 96 100 98 3.55 1 79 98 105 3.88 .33
28 3 98 104 103 3.50 1 8 5 104 107 3.82 .32
29 3 100 108 108 3.44 1 91 110 109 3.76 .32






(2 5 3 6
C3 5 4 3
ROW SUM COL, SUM
N i Tl T2 T3 V J Tl T 2 T3 V V - V
1 1 2 6 3 6 3 6. 6.
2 2 7 9 6 3. 3 12 6 6. 3.
3 2 12 12 12 4. 1 2 17 11 5.67 1.67
4 2 17 15 18 3c75 2 8 20 15 5. 1.25
5 2 22 18 24 3o6 2 14 23 19 4.6 1.
6 2 27 21 30 3.5 2 20 26 23 4.33 .83
7 2 32 2U 36 3 .42 2 26 29 27 4.14 .72
8 2 37 27 42 3o37 2 32 32 31 4. .63
9 1 39 3 3 42 3.68 2 38 35 35 4 22 .54
10 1 4l 39 42 3.9 2 44 38 39 4,4 .5
11 1 43 45 42 3.8l 3 44 44 42 4. .19
12 1 45 51 42 3.5 3 44 50 45 4.17 .67
13 2 50 54 48 3.69 3 44 56 48 4.31 .62
14 2 5.5 57 54 3.8^ 3 44 62 51 4.43 .58
15 2 60 60 60 4. 1 46 67 56 4.46 .46
16 2 65 63 66 3.94 2 52 70 60 4.37 .43
17 2 70 66 72 3.88 2 58 73 64 4.29 .41
18 2 75 69 78 3.83 2 64 76 68 4.21 .38
19 2 80 72 84 3.79 2 70 79 72 4.16 .37
20 2 85 75 90 3.75 2 76 82 76 4.1 .35
21 2 90 78 96 3.71 2 82 85 80 4.05 .34
22 2 95 81 102 3.68 2 88 88 84 4. .32
23 1 97 87 102 3.78 2 93 91 90 4.03 .25
24 1 99 93 102 3.87 2 99 94 94 4.12 .25
25 1 101 99 102 3.96 2 105 97 98 4.2 .24
26 1 103 105 102 3.92 3 105 103 101 4.03 .11
27 1 105 111 102 3.78 3 105 109 104 4.03 .25
28 2 110 114 108 3.86 3 105 115 107 4.11 .25
29 3 115 118 111 3.83 3 105 121 110 4.17 .34




THE IMPROVED BROWN METHOD PROGRAM















































































































































































Store selected row /OOXO-OOX7;7
in row sum /0100-0107.7>
(0536) -- 1 (0330) = No. of Cols
Select min value in row sum
Prepare to tally in
selected min column
Prepare to add selected column
to column sum
Save selected column
Tally in selected column
Add selected column to
column sum
Select max of column sum















































































































































Convert iteration tally to
floating point
Convert min row sum to floating
point
Compute v by floating point
Store v in 0320, 0321
Convert max column sum to
floating point
Compute v by floating point
Store v in 0320, 0321
Compute v-v
Store v=v in 0325, 0326
TS to print v, v, iteration v-v
Jump to modified routine
(i (i ti ft
it ft ti ft






























































Auxiliary for finding min row
sum










0535 00 0001 0001 0001
0536 1
0537 00 0000 0001 0000
0540 00 0007 0000 0000
054l 02 0000 0000 0014
0542 00 7777 0000 0000
0543 34 0201 0200 0520
0544 00 0010 0001 0001
0545 00 0001 0000 0000
0546 00 0000 0007 0000
05^7 14
0550 34 0100 0101 0511
0551 35 0000 0100 0100
0552 02 0000 0000 0003
0553 3 5 0536 0300 0300
0554 00 0000 7777 0000
0555 35 0000 2100 2007
0556 3
0557 35 2100 0000 2007
0560 21 0256 0344 0002
0561 34 3000 2100 0452
Data and Reloads (cont'd)
V
Print v(hold) - v(hold)
Jump back to main routine

































































Is new v greater than old v ?
If not, jump back to main
routine
Enter new row tally in 0230-0237
Reload 0167
Reload 0113
Put iteration tally in 0252 N
Put new v in 0250, 0251
Compute v=v improved method




0130 17 2020 2100 0133
0131 21 0230 0344 0010^
0132 21 0250 0344 0003
0133 33 0256 0332 0505
0134 21 0256 0344 0002
0135 21 0230 0344 0030
0136 33 0322 0253 0306]
0137 33 0253 0322 0141 (
0140 33 0323 0254 0506
0l4l 35 0310 2100 0240^
0142 35 0141 0172 01 41
0143 35 0536 0167 0167
0144 34 0330 0167 0141
0145 35 2100 2100 0167
0146 35 0171 2100 0141.
0147 31 0322 0323 0253
0150 35 0324 2100 0255
0151 31 0322 0323 2000^
0152 31 0250 0251 2002
0153 35 2100 2100 2004
0154 34 3000 2100 1000^
0155 31 2000 2001 0256
0156 17 2010 2100 0161
0157 21 0240 0344 0010]
0160 21 0253 0344 0003
0161 33 0256 0332 50 6
0162 21 0256 0344 0002
0163 21 0230 0344 0030
0164
0165 33 0325 0332 0400
0166 34 3000 2100 0342
OI67
0170 35 0300 2100 0230
0171 35 0310 2100 2.40
0172 0001 0000 0001
0340 21 0320 0344 0007
0341 34 3000 2100 0504
0342 21 0300 0344 0030
0343 22 0000 0000 0000
0344 2 0000 0000 0000
If 2020 on, don't print strategy
m a z v , m ax N
Print Player I strategy v, N
V-v<-£ No jump back to main
Print v _v routine
Print Player I__s t r a t eg^y , Player
II strategy v, N N
Is new v less than old v ?
If not, jump back to main routine




Put v in 0253, 0254
Put N in 0255
Compute
v-v improved method
Store new v-v in 0256, 0257
If 2010 on, don't print
Print min player strategy, v, N
v-v< C _No jump back to main pro-
Print v-v gram
Print Player I strategy, Player
II strategy v [ v TT
Tall^y max row
Is v-v Brown method<£? No back
to next iteration
Print out Brown strategy
v\ v N "v-v
95

COiWERl TO FLOATING POINT
1700 27 3000 1723 2006
1701 25 1711 2006 1710
1702 35 2007 2100 2000
1703 3^ 2000 2100 1712
170*1 36 1720 1715 2003
1705 30 2007 2003 2001
1706 3 5 1715 2100 2000
1707 35 2100 2100 1715
1710
1711 3^ 3000 2100 0000
1712 30 2000 1717 2000
1713 35 1716 1715 1715
171^ 3^ 3000 2100 1703
1715
1716 1
1717 02 0000 0000 1
1720 hk










































A variation i n the Brown
method of solvi
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